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Notes 
HAVE YOU SEEN MY INBOX?  GOVERNMENT 
OVERSTEPS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AGAIN:  GOODBYE TELEPHONES, HELLO E-
MAIL 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Its salient characteristics, particularly ease of use and informality, lead to 
the ‘immortalizing’ of information that normally would never be written down 
or distributed in an office memo.1 
 
Happily married John Jones, a father of four and a self-employed 
contractor, conducts as many personal and business transactions as he 
can via the Internet to free up time for his family.2  Along with managing 
his bank accounts, John pays the electric, water, credit card, health 
insurance, car payment, car insurance, and phone bills online via 
electronic mail (“e-mail”).  John corresponds via e-mail with his doctor 
regarding his son’s severe allergy condition and with his attorney 
regarding real estate investments, business practices, and general legal 
questions.  John receives payment confirmations by e-mail for paid bills 
that he archives on his Internet server, Smalltown.net.  Smalltown.net is 
a local company that serves a small town of approximately two thousand 
people. 
Unbeknownst to John, a recent increase in fraudulent health 
insurance claims regarding steroids resulted in government 
investigation.  Monthly, John makes claims on behalf of his son for a 
steroid medication used to treat his son’s allergies.  The government, 
having an interest in the Jones family health claims because of the 
steroidal prescription, obtained a warrant to seize John’s e-mail based on 
knowledge that John receives his insurance statements electronically.  
The government faxed this warrant to Smalltown.net demanding all 
John Jones’s e-mails for the past year that contained the keywords 
“health,” “medication,” or “steroids.” 
                                                 
1 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001). 
2 The above hypothetical was inspired by Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 
F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. 
LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) 
(Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  This fact 
pattern was created by the author of this Note, and any similarities to real persons or facts 
are entirely coincidental. 
Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
672 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
Smalltown.net ran a term search and printed all of the hits.  Two 
people handled the requested documents—a server technician and a 
nosy secretary, Betty Eyez, who bundled up the documents and 
packaged them for the government officials.  Ninety percent of the e-
mails in John Jones’s account hit for one of the above terms, including 
credit card and bank statements, health insurance claims, and attorney 
correspondence.  While waiting for the printing to finish, Betty Eyez 
glanced through some of John Jones’s e-mails.  Betty Eyez’s two children 
attend the same middle school as the Jones children; later, Eyez’s 
children spread rumors at school that John Jones is a drug addict who 
spends thousands of dollars on products from QVC, a large multimedia 
retailer, each year and has questionable business banking practices. 
The breach of John Jones’s privacy is an unconstitutional violation of 
the guarantees of trustworthiness provided by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.3  In light of recent decisions by United 
States district courts, ancient electronic communications law, and the 
Stored Communications Act, the Smalltown.net scenario is certainly 
plausible.  This Note discusses and analyzes the current law regarding 
governmental seizure of private e-mails that permits encroachment on 
constitutional guarantees of privacy.  
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that current procedural 
provisions governing governmental entities that desire to obtain e-mails 
as evidence from third-party service providers under Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), also known as the 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), are unconstitutional.  These 
provisions violate the Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantees because 
the pro-government provisions severely outweigh the privacy 
guaranteed to e-mail account holders.  Part II of this Note examines the 
history of the Fourth Amendment and discusses sections 2703, 2704, and 
2705 of the SCA, which address disclosure of customer e-mail from 
                                                 
3 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Establishing that evidence against an accused 
must satisfy “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. at 66.  The Court stated 
that it 
found no commentary suggesting that the Court has misidentified the 
basic interests to be accommodated.  Nor has any commentator 
demonstrated that prevailing analysis is out of line with the intentions 
of the Framers of the Sixth Amendment. . . . [W]e reject the invitation 
to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence.  Our reluctance to begin 
anew is heightened by the Court’s implicit prior rejection of principal 
alternative proposals . . . . 
Id. at 66 n.9. 
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service providers and aspects of delayed notice.4  Part III analyzes the 
constitutional problems presented by sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA, 
noting, specifically, the disparity in safeguards afforded to the 
government as compared to account holding individuals.5  Part IV 
proposes amendments to the SCA that will more effectively protect the 
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens without jeopardizing the 
government’s interest in preserving electronic evidence.6  Finally, Part V 
analyzes the hypothetical introduced above under these proposed 
amendments to the SCA.7 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
crown.  It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the 
storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot 
enter!—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!8 
 
The sanctity of privacy that William Pitt publicly announced 
regarding the Crown’s ability to conduct searches and seizures in the 
eighteenth century governs e-mail today.  Because general warrants 
violate natural expectations of privacy, our forefathers incorporated the 
Fourth Amendment into the Bill of Rights in order to enshrine powerful 
constitutional protection to a practice that had been gradually achieved 
in Great Britain.9  Yet, new technologies have created new challenges for 
                                                 
4 See infra Part II (discussing Internet technology, the history of electronic 
communications law, and relatively recent applications of electronic communications law 
to e-mail and Internet searching). 
5 See infra Part III (analyzing the overwhelming unconstitutional possibilities created by 
reading sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 together and the inconsistent judicial interpretations 
of these provisions). 
6 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the current SCA provisions governing e-
mail seizure to provide for more universal application, require police officer presence 
during seizures, and clarify objective terminology so that courts will have clear meaning). 
7 See infra Part V. 
8 William Pitt, The Elder, Earl of Chatham, Speech on the Excise Bill, Parliament (March 
1763), reprinted in HENRY PETER BROUGHAM, 1 HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF STATESMEN WHO 
FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF GEORGE III 42 (Richard Griffin & Company 1839). 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id.  But c.f. David E. Steinberg, Self-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 482–84 (2007) (suggesting that three specific 
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the historically cherished Anglo-American right to privacy.10  Electronic 
communications statutes embody outdated technological theories and 
fail to protect privacy interests.11  Part II.A provides a brief description of 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).12  Part II.B then discusses the 
background of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relevant to Title II of 
the SCA.13  Finally, Part II.C introduces the procedural aspects of sections 
2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA.14 
A. What Is an Internet Service Provider? 
ISPs allow individuals to access accounts from which they may send 
and receive e-mail.15  The server itself may be local, or it may be wide, 
                                                                                                             
controversies—the John Wilkes cases, the Paxton’s case, and the Townshend Act—led to 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment). 
10 David Snyder, The NSA’s “General Warrants”:  How the Founding Fathers Fought an 18th 
Century Version of the President’s Illegal Domestic Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2008) [hereinafter “Snyder”] (posing the question as to whether America will follow 
the Framers’ intent to step away from King George’s “unfettered executive power”).  Id.  
Snyder states that 
[w]e’ve now come full circle.  The president has essentially updated 
this page from King George’s playbook, engaging in dragnet 
surveillance of millions of Americans, regardless of whether they are 
suspected of a crime.  The founders of this country took steps to limit 
precisely this sort of unfettered executive power.  Will we? 
Id. 
11 Robert A. Pikowsky, An Argument for a Technology-Neutral Statute Governing 
Wiretapping and Interception of E-mail, 47-OCT ADVOC 23 (2004) (stating that “[t]he 
outdated statutory scheme creates a needlessly complex set of rules that unduly focuses on 
the different technologies of communication rather than the underlying privacy interest, 
which remains constant regardless of the technology employed to convey the message[]”). 
12 See infra Part II.A (explaining the basic functions of Internet Service Providers and e-
mail). 
13 See infra Part II.B (setting forth the birth of electronic communications leading up to 
the governance of e-mail, and discussing false notions of privacy and the reasonableness of 
searches). 
14 See infra Part II.C (discussing procedural aspects of three sections of the SCA). 
15 E-mail is defined in the Senate Report for the ECPA as 
a form of communication by which private correspondence is 
transmitted over public and private telephone lines.  In its most 
common form, messages are typed into a computer terminal, and then 
transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient computer operated by 
an electronic mail company.  If the intended addressee subscribes to 
the service, the message is stored by the company’s computer “mail 
box” until the subscriber calls the company to retrieve its mail, which 
is then routed over the telephone system to the recipient’s computer.  
If the addressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail 
company can put the message onto paper and then deposit it in the 
normal postal system. 
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such as the Internet.16  The Internet is not a centralized system and can be 
thought of as a “crazy game of connect-the-dots.”17  ISPs give individuals 
                                                                                                             
Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may be 
proprietary, such as systems operated by private companies for 
internal correspondence. 
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986).  This definition of e-mail transmissions over telephone lines 
exemplifies the pace at which technology is progressing.  Today, eighteen years later, the 
transmissions occur over telephone lines, digital subscriber lines (“DSLs”), and cable lines.  
This is not to say that the definition is not applicable.  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 405 (11th ed. 2004).  Compared to the Senate Report, Merriam-Webster’s 
definition essentially gets the same point across but appears to assume that the reader is 
familiar with the concept of e-mail; Merriam-Webster defines e-mail as “a means or system 
for transmitting messages electronically (as between computers on a network)”; and 
“messages sent and received electronically through an e-mail system[.]”  Id.  See also MSN. 
Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566348/E-Mail.html (last visited Jan. 
31, 2008).  E-mail is defined as a “method of transmitting data, text files, digital photos, or 
audio and video files from one computer to another” over a condensed or broad network.  
Id.  Since the 1990s, e-mail has greatly enhanced the communications of both businesses 
and individuals.  Id. 
16 See Glossary of Internet & Web Jargon, UC BERKELEY—TEACHING LIBRARY INTERNET 
WORKSHOPS, http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/Glossary.html 
#RSS (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).  The “Internet” is defined as 
[t]he vast collection of interconnected networks that all use the TCP/IP 
protocols and that evolved from the ARPANET of the late 60’s and 
early 70’s.  An “internet” (lower case i) is any computers connected to 
each other (a network), and are not part of the Internet unless the [sic] 
use TCP/IP protocols.  An “intranet” is a private network inside a 
company or organization that uses the same kinds of software that you 
would find on the public Internet, but that is only for internal use.  An 
intranet may be on the Internet or may simply be a network. 
Id.  Further, a “server” may be defined as 
[a] computer running that software, assigned an IP address, and 
connected to the Internet so that it can provide documents via the 
World Wide Web.  Also called HOST computer.  Web servers are the 
closest equivalent to what in the print world is called the “publisher” 
of a print document.  An important difference is that most print 
publishers carefully edit the content and quality of their publications 
in an effort to market them and future publications.  This convention is 
not required in the Web world, where anyone can be a publisher; 
careful evaluation of Web pages is therefore mandatory.  Also called a 
“Host.” 
Id.  See also MSN. Encarta, supra note 15.  Servers are computers that supply “services or 
data to other machines on a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN) such 
as the Internet.”  Id.  Essentially, files, pictures, codes, and messages are transmitted back 
and forth between servers throughout the network.  Id. 
17 Rob Kolstad, Becoming an Internet Service Provider, http://docs.rinet.ru/becomeISP/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008).  Kolstad notes that the Internet’s connectivity aspects are “not 
organized like an army with a ‘President’ node at the top with ‘General’ nodes directly 
beneath it.  The Internet is more like a hodge-podge of various interconnections that 
resemble more a crazy game of connect-the-dots than a cleverly designed backbone-with-
branches.”  Id.  Furthermore, 
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the means to send messages from individual computers via commercial 
e-mail programs or mail-user agents.18  Essentially, ISPs provide account 
holders the ability to send, receive, and store opened and unopened e-
mails associated with the ISPs’ systems, which may also be thought of as 
the mail servers themselves.19  The e-mails stored on ISP systems are 
available for different lengths of time depending on the server.20  Having 
                                                                                                             
To connect to the Internet, one identifies an ‘Internet Service Provider’ 
(ISP) that is already connected to the Internet and negotiates a business 
agreement to join the Internet through them.  The list of ISPs is large 
and includes tiny ISPs with a single computer and some dial-in lines 
and large ISPs with thousands of miles of fiber strung around the 
country.  Different ISPs offer different strengths and different costs. 
Id. 
18 MSN Encarta, supra note 15.  Most commercial or mail-user programs have text 
editors for composing messages, and all the sender needs to provide is a destination 
address.  Id.  See R. Kayne, What is a Mail User Agent, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-
is-a-mail-user-agent.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).  Wise Geek defines mail user agent as 
follows: 
A mail user agent (MUA) is an email program; software designed to 
collect and send electronic mail.  It is also referred to as an email 
program, or email client.  The term “mail user agent” is less familiar to 
the average person, but is used in email headers.  The headers of the 
email supply information to the mail servers or computers that handle 
transferring messages across networks like the Internet. 
Id.  See KENNETH E. JOHNSON, THE LAWYER’S QUICK GUIDE TO E-MAIL 10 (1998).  The actual 
communication process for e-mails takes place as follows: 
When you are ready to send or receive e-mail, you log on to the 
Internet through your ISP.  Your e-mail program communicates with 
the mail server at the ISP through “protocols,” which are simply 
definitions of how computers talk to one another.  Standard protocols 
allow different computers and computers with different operating 
systems and software to communicate reliably, since they all speak the 
same “language.” 
Id. 
19 AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (APRI), NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
ASSOCIATION, THE ECPA, ISPS & OBTAINING E-MAIL:  A PRIMER FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS 10 
(2005), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ecpa_isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf. 
20 Id. at 20.  The APRI report addresses the problem of varying retention periods of ISPs: 
Retention periods for subscriber and transactional records and e-mail 
content records vary greatly among ISPs.  Moreover, there are no 
statutorily mandated or industry guidelines regarding preservation of 
this information prior to request from law enforcement.  Indeed, it is 
not unusual for ISPs to dispose of e-mail information and content after 
only days, even hours. 
Id.  See Jon Swartz & Kevin Johnson, U.S. Asks Internet Firms to Save Data, USA TODAY, June 
1, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-05-31-
internet-records_x.htm.  On a similar note, top law enforcement officials have requested 
longer retention periods, than days or hours, of histories from Internet companies such as 
Google, Microsoft, AOL, Comcast, and Verizon.  Id.  Problems associated with this request 
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a basic understanding of how ISPs handle e-mail is essential to assessing 
how much invasive power the government should have.  Fourth 
Amendment history and electronic communications case law is an 
appropriate place to begin the discussion of shielding individuals from 
the dangers of governmental privacy invasion.21 
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Relevant To Title II of the Stored 
Communications Act 
In England, in the 1760s, motivated by the reign of King George III, 
William Pitt declared certain individual rights fundamental, notoriously 
advocated for freedom of speech, and chastised general warrants 
granted by the King.22  In the United States, the Fourth Amendment 
resulted because the former colonists of the states feared, and therefore 
disliked, warrants that would allow the police to search any and all 
persons—merely on the government’s whim.23  Contrary to these general 
warrants, the Fourth Amendment’s text, which remains unchanged since 
its adoption in 1793, guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.24  In 1980, the United States Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                             
for longer retention periods are cost-based and Internet companies’ concerns for violating 
operating policies.  Id.  
21 See infra Part II.B. 
22 Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P. 1763).  In Wilkes, the court 
eventually found forty-five general warrants invalid and declared general warrants “totally 
subversive of the liberty of the [warrant’s] subject.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
23 See Snyder, supra note 10.  Snyder notes that because a newspaper criticized the King 
of England, the King signed off on any general warrants applicable to printers or those 
taking part in publication.  Id.  The King’s officers obtained power to rummage through all 
manuscripts and writings and cut through hundreds of locks.  Id.  Furthermore, the general 
warrants “spurred colonists toward revolution and directly motivated James Madison’s 
crafting of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
24 See supra note 9 (citing the text of the Fourth Amendment).  See also Snyder, supra note 
10.  See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XIV.  Snyder correctly notes that James Madison relied 
on the Massachusetts’ Constitution when drafting the Fourth Amendment.  Snyder, supra 
note 10.  See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XIV.  The Massachusetts Constitution provided as 
follows: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, 
and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his 
possessions.  All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the 
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or 
affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make 
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, 
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure:  and 
no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities 
prescribed by the laws. 
Id. 
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“‘indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 
“general warrants” were the immediate evils that motivated the framing 
and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.’”25  Since the Amendment’s 
incorporation into the Constitution, courts have struggled to determine 
exactly what types of searches are reasonable, especially in regard to 
recent electronic communications.26  The relevant case law discussing 
reasonable searches begins with the governance of telephone calls in Katz 
v. United States and Smith v. Maryland.27 
                                                 
25 Snyder, supra note 10 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)).  See 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 577.  Payton explained why the “reasons for upholding warrantless 
arrests in a public place do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home.”  
Id. 
It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.  Yet is [sic] is also well settled that objects such as 
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the 
police without a warrant.  The seizure of property in plain view 
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, 
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with 
criminal activity. 
Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted).  The Court turned to common law in order to analyze the 
fundamental importance of privacy in the home: 
It is obvious that the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests 
was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places.  Indeed, 
particularly considering the prominence of Lord Coke, the weight of 
authority as it appeared to the Framers was to the effect that a warrant 
was required, or at the minimum that there were substantial risks in 
proceeding without one.  The common-law sources display a 
sensitivity to privacy interests that could not have been lost on the 
Framers.  The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a 
“man’s house is his castle,” made it abundantly clear that both in 
England and in the Colonies “the freedom of one’s house” was one of 
the most vital elements of English liberty. 
Id. at 596–97 (footnote omitted). 
26 James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure:  Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace 
with Technology, PRACTICING LAW INST. NO. 11253, 407, 412 (2007).  Dempsey stated that 
“[p]rivacy is an important constitutional value and a crucial component of the trust 
necessary for the flourishing of digital commerce and democracy.  However, while 
technology has changed dramatically in the past twenty years, privacy law has not kept 
pace.”  Id. 
27 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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1. Katz and Smith Establish Basic Standards for Evaluating Electronic 
Communications28 
The United States Supreme Court found itself torn between the 
competing interests of privacy and security in the 1960s and 1970s when 
it decided Katz and Smith.29  In analyzing the Fourth Amendment, these 
judicial opinions distinguished the act of making a phone call from the 
content of the call itself.30  In Katz, the Plaintiff’s telephone conversations 
were captured while he spoke in a telephone booth.31  The Court noted 
that the Plaintiff “sought to exclude when he entered the booth . . . not 
the intruding eye . . . [but] the uninvited ear.”32  Relying on Katz and 
                                                 
28 Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.  Katz and Smith set the stage as the relevant 
case law governing electronic communication of telephone calls.  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.  In Katz, the United States Supreme Court declared that 
surveillance of telephone conversations amounted to a search where the caller “is surely 
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world.”  Id.  The Court held that because of this entitlement, Defendant Katz did not give 
up his privacy rights when he engaged in a telephone conversation.  Id.  See Snyder, supra 
note 10, at 6.  Snyder stated that “[i]n recognizing that [sic] the principle that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits indiscriminate searches regardless of the technology involved, the 
Court made it plain that advanced technology doesn’t clear the government of the duty to 
establish probable cause, and to receive a warrant, before rummaging through the private 
lives of Americans.”  Id.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 442 (1976).  Further, in Miller, 
the Defendant filed a motion to suppress records relating to his accounts at two banks after 
alleging that the records had been illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Id.  The Court held that, “[o]n their face, the documents subpoenaed here [we]re not 
respondent’s ‘private papers[;]’ . . .  respondent c[ould] assert neither ownership nor 
possession.  Instead, these [we]re the business records of the banks.”  Id. at 440. 
30 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan concurred, stating 
that Katz holds only 
(a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, a 
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place 
that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected 
area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, 
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. 
Id. 
31 Id. at 352. 
32 Id.  The Court further noted: 
He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls 
from a place where he might be seen.  No less than an individual in a 
business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a 
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and 
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to 
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be 
broadcast to the world.  To read the Constitution more narrowly is to 
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Smith, courts have recognized that certain account information is 
expected to be available to police powers without warrants, such as a list 
of the numbers dialed from a phone, check information, and account 
registration information.33  However, information that is not specifically 
content-oriented is expected to be private because people have a right to 
reasonably expect that private content will not be searched without a 
warrant.34  In order to determine whether e-mail privacy is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, further examination of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is necessary.  Smith set forth two requirements that are 
necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protection:  first, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and second, that the defendant’s expectation of 
privacy is viewed as objectively reasonable by society.35 
The first appropriate question raised in Smith is whether an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to e-
mail.36  Particularly in the private sector, the “third-party doctrine”37 
                                                                                                             
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in 
private communication. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
33 United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078 (6th Cir. 1993).  Phone and credit card 
records have been found to be “readily accessible to employees during the normal course 
of business[,]” and therefore Defendant may not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Id.; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (discussing that where banking information, such as 
checks and deposit slips, is available to employees during the normal course of business, 
there can be no expectation of privacy).  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.  Further, in Smith, phone 
number records recorded by a pen register are also banned from information of which an 
individual may expect privacy.  Id.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006).  Comparatively, in 
regard to e-mail, the SCA has explicitly stated that e-mail account holder information is not 
expected to be private and, therefore, may be obtained by police without notice being 
provided to the customer.  Id.  Specifically, name, address, local and long distance 
telephone records, length of service and type, any identifying numbers including assigned 
network address, and means and source of payment are not generally expected to be 
private information by individual account holders.  Id. 
34 See supra note 29 (discussing the opinion in Katz, which found that words uttered into 
a mouthpiece are not expected to be broadcast to the world). 
35 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (1979).  Smith held that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
embraces two discrete questions.  The first is whether the individual, 
by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual 
has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as private.”  The 
second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of 
privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”—
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual’s 
expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the 
circumstances. 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
36 Id.  Smith held that application of the Fourth Amendment is directly dependent on 
whether an individual has a “‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of 
privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”  Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
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comes into play because many e-mail messages are designed to be sent 
to a third party or stored on an Internet company’s remote server.38  The 
third-party doctrine holds that once an individual voluntarily exposes 
information to another individual, the original party that disclosed the 
information no longer maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                                                                             
128, 143, 150, 151 (1978)); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Miller, 425 U.S. at 
442; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 
335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Mancusi 
v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
37 “Third-party doctrine” is phraseology used by the author of this Note.  See Miller, 425 
U.S. at 443; see also White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); 
Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427 (1963).  The Court has consistently described the “third-
party doctrine” as “information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him [the third 
party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.”  Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.  See also White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa, 385 U.S. 
at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. 427. 
38 Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux:  Internet Search Records and the 
Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2007).  
Lawless stated: 
The messenger/recipient distinction is clearly exhibited in the context 
of e-mail.  If one sends an e-mail “to” America Online (AOL) for 
account assistance, AOL would be the recipient of the message; on the 
other hand, where AOL merely transmits the message and stores it on 
its server, it is not the recipient of the communication but its 
messenger. 
Id.  See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).  The discussion in this Note is based 
on private sector e-mail.  See id.  Courts adapt their analysis for governmental workplace 
situations to use the “operational realities” test.  See id.  The Supreme Court acknowledged 
the operational realities test for the first time in O’Connor.  Id.  In O’Connor, the Court held:  
The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some 
employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is 
by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.  Public 
employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file 
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, 
may be reduced by virtue of [sic] actual office practices and 
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. . . .  The employee’s 
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the 
employment relation.  An office is seldom a private enclave free from 
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal 
invitees.  Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by 
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for 
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits.  Simply put, 
it is the nature of government offices that others—such as fellow 
employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public—
may have frequent access to an individual’s office. 
Id.  The operational realities test has its own discrepancies which are not discussed in this 
Note, but for a general overview and examples especially regarding Internet searches, see 
Lawless, supra note 38, at 22 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is the proper remedial 
tool for suppression of Internet search records). 
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with regard to the information.39  Package and letter carrier services are 
not third parties for purposes of this doctrine; instead, only the recipient 
who opens the package qualifies as a third party.40  Comparably, if a 
sufficient privacy interest applies to e-mails, then the government must 
have probable cause to secure a warrant before seizing the e-mails.41  On 
the contrary, if e-mails do not contain a sufficient privacy interest, then 
the government must meet only a reasonable standard before seizing the 
e-mails.42 
Second, Smith advises that e-mail should be protected under the 
Fourth Amendment when the user’s privacy interest is reasonable.43  For 
example, in Warshak v. United States (“Warshak I”), the government seized 
the Plaintiff’s e-mails directly from ISPs along with, as allowed by 
federal statute, the Plaintiff’s account information.44  The government 
                                                 
39 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  In Jacobsen, employees of Federal 
Express observed white powder that seemed to be concealed in four baggies within a tube 
that protruded from a box damaged by transport.  Id. at 111.  The Court held that 
defendants, addressees of package, had no expectation of privacy regarding the baggies 
due to the unsealed condition of the package and the insurance policy that Federal Express 
carried.  Id. at 111, 119. 
40 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,10 (1977); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 
U.S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).  See supra note 37 (explaining 
how the Court has described the third-party doctrine, and showing how package and letter 
carrier services are not third parties for purposes of this doctrine). 
41 Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 469 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other 
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified 
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  The court compared Phibbs and Miller to Katz and Smith, 
where the issue in those cases was whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for information desired by the government.  Id. at 470.  “The distinction between 
Katz and Miller makes clear that the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry in the 
context of shared communications must necessarily focus on two narrower questions than 
the general fact that the communication was shared with another.”  Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
44 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  The 
SCA distinguishes between account information, which the government is generally 
allowed to obtain, and content of e-mail messages.  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006); see also infra 
note 123 and accompanying text for the statutory list of general account information.  The 
burden is much higher for content seizures than simply seizures of account information.  
Id.  In Warshak I, the Magistrate Judge issued an order which 
Direct[ed] [the] internet service provider . . . to turn over to 
government agents information pertaining to Warshak’s e-mail 
account with NuVox.  The information to be disclosed included (1) 
customer account information, such as application information, 
“account identifiers,” “[b]illing information to include bank account 
numbers,” contact information, and “[any] other information 
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argued that the Plaintiff had only a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with regard to e-mail, similar to the expectation of privacy for a letter 
mailed by the United States Postal Service.45  E-mails resemble paper 
letters because both typically have an addressed recipient.46  Similarly, 
both electronic communications services and postal services carry items 
that are clearly less private than paper letters, such as blogs,47 magazines, 
                                                                                                             
pertaining to the customer, including set up, synchronization, etc.”; (2) 
“[t]he contents of wire or electronic communications (not in electronic 
storage unless greater than 181 days old) that were placed or stored in 
directories or files owned or controlled” by Warshak; and (3) “[a]ll Log 
files and backup tapes.” 
490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 
(6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), 
rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (some alterations in 
original) (emphasis added). 
45 Id.  Warshak argued that “the government could not get around the privacy interest 
attached to a private letter by simply subpoenaing the postal service with no showing of 
probable cause, because unlike in Phibbs, postal workers would not be expected to read the 
letter in the normal course of business.”  Id. at 471.  Letters and packages have been 
protected under the Fourth Amendment for more than two hundred years.  See Ex parte 
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727.  The Court acknowledged this protection of privacy in 1878 when it 
decided in Ex parte Jackson that “[l]etters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as 
fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and 
weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”  Id. 
at 733.  And the Court observed further:  
No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with 
the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and 
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to 
mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle 
embodied in the fourth amendment [sic] of the Constitution. 
Id. 
46 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 472, vacated on other grounds en banc by U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 
(6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), 
rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  E-mails “typically have a 
limited, select number of recipients.”  Id. 
47 As defined by Merriam-Webster, a blog is “a Web site that contains an online personal 
journal with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks provided by the writer[.]”  
Http://www.m-w.com/ (search “blog”).  See also Glossary of Internet & Web Jargon, UC 
BERKELEY—TEACHING LIBRARY INTERNET WORKSHOPS, http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/ 
TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/Glossary.html#Internet (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).  The 
Berkeley teaching library defines a blog as: 
A blog (short for “web log”) is a type of web page that serves as a 
publicly accessible personal journal (or log) for an individual.  
Typically updated daily, blogs often reflect the personality of the 
author.  Blog software usually has an archive of old blog postings.  
Many blogs can be searched for terms in the archive.  Blogs have 
become a vibrant, fast-growing medium for communication in 
professional, poltical [sic], news, trendy, and other specialized web 
communities.  Many blogs provide RSS feeds [Rich Site Summary], to 
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and leaflets and brochures addressed generically to “Resident.”48  
Essentially, in the normal course of business, both ISPs and United States 
postal workers are expected to refrain from reading the contents of 
“sealed” items.49 
Letters and e-mails, similar to phone calls, are not entitled to 
absolute protection under the Fourth Amendment because their contents 
may be disclosed by the recipient.50  As the Supreme Court explained, 
“when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes 
the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the 
authorities[.]”51  This may seem like common sense because, as most 
people learned in kindergarten, best friends do not always keep secrets.52  
Unfortunately, due to statutory exceptions for both law enforcement and 
emergencies, situations before the court are not always this simple.53  
                                                                                                             
which one can subscribe and receive alerts to new postings in selected 
blogs. 
Id. 
48 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.  The different levels of expectation of privacy simply 
draws attention to the fact that some mailings, whether electronic or snail, are less private 
than others.  Id.  The Court held in Ex Parte Jackson that: 
[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter,-
between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as 
letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open 
to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other 
printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined. 
Id.  See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).  Therefore, today, users of such 
electronic communication, such as Internet bulletin boards and blogs, “would logically lack 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication or public 
posting.”  Id. 
49 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 471, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  
“Sealed” in the normal course of business refers to an item that is mailed with a specific 
addressee and that is packaged and addressed correctly.  Id. 
50 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (stating that “when an 
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant 
will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of that information[]”).  Upon sending information to 
another individual, the sender loses his or her expectation of privacy because the receiver 
can distribute the information as the receiver sees fit.  Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See infra note 55 (discussing an instance in which the third-party rule prevailed against 
a challenge to the Fourth Amendment because right to privacy does not extend to 
voluntary third parties). 
53 Warshak I, 490 F.3d. at 462, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  
“Portions of the SCA that are not directly at stake here prohibit unauthorized access of 
electronic communications (§ 2701) and prohibit a service provider from divulging the 
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However, generally, the recipient of information that was disclosed via 
mail does not have the right to protect this information against 
governmental searches, and this is known as the third-party exception to 
individual expectations of privacy.54  Therefore, the recipient may be 
subpoenaed to disclose the contents of a conversation, message, or letter, 
and in such instances, the sender may not raise a Fourth Amendment 
challenge.55  Of course, e-mail complicates matters because the 
technological medium allows for inexpensive and indefinite storage 
capacity.56  Still, similar to disclosure of information to a third-party in 
the context of mail, if lowered expectations of privacy are established 
with regard to e-mails, a Fourth Amendment challenge may be barred.57  
The next two cases address one specific judge’s uneasiness with 
breaching e-mail privacy.58 
2. Sister New York Cases—Doe I and Doe II:  Lack of Notice 
In both Doe v. Ashcroft (“Doe I”) and Doe v. Gonzales (“Doe II”), Judge 
Marrero of the Southern District of New York declared unconstitutional 
statutorily issued gag orders for government officials who obtained 
electronic communications as evidence.59  Both cases, although later 
partially overruled, discuss the importance of an individual’s privacy as 
it relates to e-mail and Congress’s competing interest of maintaining 
                                                                                                             
contents of electronic communications that it is storing for a customer with certain 
exceptions pertaining to law enforcement needs (§ 2702).”  Id. 
54 SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 737 (1984).  In SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, the 
Court declared that “when a person communicates information to a third party, even on 
the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third 
party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.”  Id. at 
735–36. 
55 See United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995).  In King, the court stated 
that “[o]nce frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information . . . .”  
Id. 
56 See Dempsey, supra note 26, at 418.  Dempsey explained the changes in storage space 
and methods for storing since the enactment of the current laws, stating that 
[i]n the past, particularly at the time when current email privacy laws 
were written, email users accessed their email by downloading it onto 
their personal computers.  That process often resulted in the deletion 
of the email from the computers of the service provider.  Now, email--
including email that has been read but which still has value to the 
user--often sits on a third party server accessible via the Web. 
Id. 
57 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing expectations of privacy as established in Katz). 
58 See infra Part II.B.3. 
59 Doe v. Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), overruled in part by Doe, 
Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d. Cir. 2008); Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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national security.60  First, in Doe I, in 2004, the court held that National 
Security Letters (“NSLs”)61 used by the FBI were unconstitutional 
                                                 
60 Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 
F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. 
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).  In 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took up 
the issue and overruled in part Doe I and Doe II, declaring: 
To recapitulate our conclusions, we (1) construe subsection 2709(c) to 
permit a nondisclosure requirement only when senior FBI officials 
certify that disclosure may result in an enumerated harm that is related 
to “an authorized investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” (2) construe 
subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) to place on the Government the 
burden to show that a good reason exists to expect that disclosure of 
receipt of an NSL will risk an enumerated harm, (3) construe 
subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) to mean that the Government satisfies 
its burden when it makes an adequate demonstration as to why 
disclosure in a particular case may result in an enumerated harm, (4) 
rule that subsections 2709(c) and 3511(b) are unconstitutional to the extent 
that they impose a nondisclosure requirement without placing on the 
Government the burden of initiating judicial review of that requirement, and 
(5) rule that subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) are unconstitutional to the 
extent that, upon such review, a governmental official's certification that 
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere 
with diplomatic relations is treated as conclusive. 
Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe III), 549 F.3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (agreeing 
in holdings (4) and (5) that certain provisions of the ECPA are indeed unconstitutional).  
Where the district court invalidated the entire section of the Act, the Second Circuit Court 
instead only partially invalidated certain sections and instilled its own procedural 
safeguards: 
[W]e need not invalidate the entirety of the nondisclosure requirement 
of subsection 2709(c) or the judicial review provisions of subsection 
3511(b). Although the conclusive presumption clause of subsections 
3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) must be stricken, we invalidate subsection 2709(c) 
and the remainder of subsection 3511(b) only to the extent that they 
fail to provide for Government-initiated judicial review. The 
Government can respond to this partial invalidation ruling by using 
the suggested reciprocal notice procedure. With this procedure in 
place, subsections 2709(c) and 3511(b) would survive First Amendment 
challenge. 
Id. at 884.  After salvaging the statutory interpretations and partial invalidations, the 
Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to give the Government an 
opportunity to satisfy the newly outline constitutional standards for maintaining 
disclosure.  Id. at 885.  Therefore, this case, and accordingly the judicial interpretations of 
the statute are not yet over. 
61 Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe 
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).  NSLs “constitute a unique form of administrative 
subpoena cloaked in secrecy and pertaining to national security issues.  The statute bars all 
NSL recipients from ever disclosing that the FBI has issued an NSL.”  Id.  See Adam Liptak, 
Judge Voids F.B.I. Tool Granted By Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A18.  A columnist 
for the New York Times stated that the letters 
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because they demanded a wide variety of information, were too broad, 
and did not include a time limit for their sealed notice.62  While the 
government appealed, Congress amended the pertinent statute—the 
USA Patriot Act—and the judgment was vacated pursuant to the Act.63  
Then, Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) brought 
another action in Doe II, claiming that the Patriot Act as amended was 
still unconstitutional.64 
In Doe I, the Plaintiffs—Doe and the ACLU—challenged the Patriot 
Act’s nondisclosure requirement.65  In response, Judge Marrero stated 
                                                                                                             
allowed the F.B.I. not only to force communications companies, 
including telephone and Internet providers, to turn over the records 
without court authorization, but also to forbid the companies to tell the 
customers or anyone else what they had done.  Under the law, enacted 
last year, the ability of the courts to review challenges to the ban on 
disclosures was quite limited. 
Id. 
62 Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 511, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe 
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). 
The Court holds only that such fundamental rights are certainly 
implicated in some cases in which the Government may employ § 2709 
broadly to gather information, thus requiring that the process 
incorporate the safeguards of some judicial review to ensure that if an 
infringement of those rights is asserted, they are adequately protected 
through fair process in an independent neutral tribunal.  Because the 
[safeguard provisions] are wholly absent here, the Court finds on this 
ground additional cause for invalidating § 2709 as applied. 
Id.  Furthermore, the court generally held that “compulsory, secret, and unreviewable 
production of information required by the FBI’s application of 18 U.S.C. § 2709 violates the 
Fourth Amendment, and that the non-disclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) violates 
the First Amendment.”  Id. at 526–27. 
63 Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 385–86, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey 
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008) (giving a brief overview of the Ashcroft (Doe I) holding 
and the subsequent amendment of the USA Patriot Act). 
64 Id. at 395–96.  The district court was concerned with nondisclosure orders and 
congressional violations, through the use of the statute, of fundamental principles of checks 
and balances.  Id. 
65 Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 474–75, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey 
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).  The nondisclosure requirement 
authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to compel 
communications firms, such as internet service providers (“ISPs”) or 
telephone companies, to produce certain customer records whenever 
the FBI certifies that those records are “relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”  The FBI's demands under § 2709 are issued in 
the form of national security letters (“NSLs”), which constitute a 
unique form of administrative subpoena cloaked in secrecy and 
pertaining to national security issues. The statute bars all NSL 
recipients from ever disclosing that the FBI has issued an NSL. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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that “[t]he statute fail[ed] constitutional strict scrutiny[] . . . because it 
require[d] the court to blindly credit a finding that there ‘may’ be a 
reason—potentially any conceivable and not patently frivolous reason—
for it to believe disclosure [would] result in a certain harm.”66  In Doe II, 
when the case came before the court again in 2007, Judge Marrero held 
for the second time that the use of the NSLs was unconstitutional 
because it lacked procedural safeguards.67  Essentially, Judge Marrero’s 
opinions reflected his discomfort about giving the FBI such broad 
discretion without ensuring sufficient safeguards.68  The notion of e-mail 
privacy is described somewhat superficially by more recent cases that 
specifically address sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA.69 
3. Current E-Mail Jurisprudence:  Warshak I, Warshak II, and Allen 
Few cases analyze the constitutionality of, or even discuss, sections 
2703 and 2705 of the SCA.  One case that does, however, is Warshak I.70  
In Warshak I, the government obtained a court order directing Plaintiff 
Steven Warshak’s (“Warshak”) ISP to turn over both Warshak’s e-mail 
account information and the contents of his e-mails.71  The court issued 
the order under seal, which, for ninety days, prohibited the ISP from 
                                                 
66  Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 418, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe 
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); see also http://news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly. 
pl?page=/andrews/bt/prv/20070925/20070925_doe.html. (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
67 Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe 
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “§ 2709(c) is unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment because it functions as a licensing scheme that does not afford adequate 
procedural safeguards[] . . .”). 
68 Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475–76, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey 
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).  Due to the fact that section 2709(c) prohibited 
recipients of the NSLs from giving notice to anyone and that there was no provision 
providing that the ban could be lifted, the section violated the Fourth Amendment because, 
as applied, it barred or deterred judicial challenge.  Id.  See also Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. 
Supp. 2d at 425, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
69 See infra Part II.B.3. 
70 United States v. Warshak, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (Warshak I), vacated on other 
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified 
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  In Warshak I, the Defendant was suspected of mail fraud, 
wire fraud, money laundering, and other related federal offenses.  Id. at 460. 
71 Id.  The e-mail content requested also included e-mails which had been deleted from 
storage for fewer than 181 days.  Id.  The government also requested copies of all log files 
and backup tapes which were not pertinent to the point discussed at that time.  Id.  
Requesting e-mails that are more than 180 days old requires a lesser burden by the 
government than e-mails which are equal to or fewer than 180 days old.  See infra note 126 
and accompanying text (discussing e-mail storage time frame provisions under Section 
2703). 
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notifying Warshak that the government had access to his records.72  
However, more than one year after the order was granted, Plaintiff 
Warshak still did not have notice of his e-mail seizure.73  Government 
officials finally informed Warshak about the prior seizure one day after 
the order was unsealed.74  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
then granted Warshak an injunction that barred the government from 
seeking additional e-mails without providing notice to Warshak.75  
Months later, the court vacated the injunction and scheduled an en banc 
hearing to determine whether government agents had acted in good 
faith when they requested the e-mails.76  Because the government had 
                                                 
72 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  This 
ninety-day seal is permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B).  Id. 
73 Id.  In Warshak I, the government admitted it had violated section 2703, and it did not 
seek statutorily provided extensions for renewal of seal.  Id. at 461 n.1. 
74 Id. at 460–61. 
75 Id. at 462. 
76 Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741, 1 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 
2007) (en banc), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on 
other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  Subsequently, in December 2007, 
the district court allowed the presentation of the Nuvox e-mails as evidence.  United States 
v. Warshak, 2007 WL 4410237, *5 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), modified by 532 F.3d 
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  As a result of Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion in 
Warshak II, the court acknowledged that the government had the e-mails in its possession 
before the delayed notice provision expired.  Id.  During this hearing the court did not rule 
on the constitutionality of the SCA, and instead relied on the fact that the government held 
the questionable e-mails at the proper time.  Id.  In July 2008, the court, sitting en banc, 
ruled on Warshak for a third time.  Warshak v. United States (Warshak III), 532 F.3d 521 (6th 
Cir. 2008).  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the injunction prohibiting future ex 
parte searches on the legal grounds that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.  Id. at 526.  
The judges split on the issue 9-5 with Judge Martin Jr., who had ruled on the initial 
injunction in Warshak I, penning a stinging dissent.  Id. at 534.  Judge Martin Jr. accused the 
majority of sidestepping the issue instead of reaching the question of whether the delayed 
notice provision of the SCA is unconstitutional.  Id. at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent further states, “Despite the fact that a violation of one of the bedrock principles of 
the Bill of Rights has been alleged, today the majority has decided to treat the government 
more favorably than a private litigant would be treated in a similar preliminary injunction 
setting.”  Id. at 537.  The dissent accuses the majority of not only tilting the law in favor of 
the government, but also disregarding mandatory precedent in the Sixth Circuit.  Id. at 535.  
Finally, the dissent ends its discussion by chastising the government’s investigatory 
strength: 
If it is free speech, freedom of religion, or the right to bear arms, we are 
quick to strike down laws that curtail those freedoms.  But if we are 
discussing the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, heaven forbid that we should intrude on the 
government’s investigatory province and actually require it to abide by the 
mandates of the Bill of Rights.  I can only imagine what our founding 
fathers would think of this decision.  If I were to tell James Otis and 
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obtained the challenged e-mails before the delayed notice expired, the 
court in Warshak II found that whether the SCA was constitutional 
remained unanswered because the judgment in Warshak I had been 
vacated.77  Warshak I and II show the difficulties that one district court 
has had in deciding issues involving the SCA. 
In addition, the court in Warshak I relied on United States v. Miller to 
explain that the “reasonable relevance” standard was appropriate.78  
Pursuant to this standard, government intrusion is less likely, and 
furthermore, if a party demonstrates that a legitimate expectation of 
privacy attaches to the seized records, the party has standing to dispute 
the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds.79 
Ultimately, the court in Warshak II held that e-mail account holders 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.80  Privacy can be waived, but if 
it is not, e-mails are private and protected from government intrusion 
unless proper channels are used to demand access to them.81  The court 
noted that the safeguards in place operate in the government’s favor, 
namely the requirements of obtaining a warrant and notifying the 
                                                                                                             
John Adams that a citizen’s private correspondence is now potentially 
subject to ex parte and unannounced searches by the government 
without a warrant supported by probable cause, what would they say?  
Probably nothing, they would be left speechless. 
Id. at 538 (first emphasis added). 
77 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing that the Warshak II court’s 
vacation of the injunction against the e-mails was only due to the time issue).  See also 
Warshak II, 2007 WL 4410237 at *5, modified by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) 
(noting that the defendant’s reliance on Warshak I seems a bit misplaced due to the Sixth 
Circuit vacating Warshak I’s judgment in Warshak II when the fate of 2703(d) was in limbo).  
See infra Part III.C.3 (for a discussion of the delayed notice provision). 
78 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 468–69, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (citing 
Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263–264 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 444 (1976)).  The government argued that the court issued orders resembled subpoenas 
rather than pure searches, and thus, the government did not need to show probable cause.  
Id. at 468.  If true, then the “reasonable relevance” standard suffices, and probable cause is 
not necessary.  Id.; see also United States v. Valdicieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d. 332, 340 
(D. Puerto Rico 2007) (supporting the proposition that “probable cause for [a] search 
warrant . . . need not be tantamount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt; probability is the 
touchstone[]”). 
79 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 468–69, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) 
(quoting Doe, 253 F.3d at 263–64; Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 (1976)). 
80 Id. at 481–82. 
81 Id.  The court recognized the balancing of interests that needs to occur between those 
interests of the accused, the government, and the public.  Id. at 481. 
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account holder that a warrant has been obtained.82  Such constitutional 
safeguards protect individual interests and act as a roadblock and 
prevent the government from depriving of an essential constitutional 
right—the right to privacy.83  Last, even if a warrant or subpoena is used 
to obtain e-mail records from an ISP, not all e-mails will fall within the 
request because the scope of the request must be narrowly tailored to the 
issue at hand.84 
                                                 
82 Id. at 481.  The government still has the option to seize e-mails by obtaining a warrant, 
notifying the account holder, or showing that the account holder has waived his 
expectation of privacy.  Id.  Furthermore, section 2703(f) of the SCA allows the government 
to require the ISP to preserve e-mails for evidentiary reasons, and the government may 
obtain the e-mails from the receiving or sending party.  Id.; see also Lawless, supra note 38 
(discussing what constitutes third party material in relation to sending and receiving e-
mails).  Additionally, the court does not rule out that some e-mail account holders may 
have lesser expectations of privacy due to heavy screening of e-mail.  Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 
478, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on 
other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  The difference is computer 
generated screening and frequency: 
[I]t is entirely possible, if not likely, that this process occurs without 
ever having a human being read the content of subscribers’ e-mails.  
Where total access is the norm, we hold that the government may 
show as much and then may compel disclosure through the ISP.  Less 
in-depth screening, however, is insufficient to diminish the privacy 
interest in an e-mail account. 
Id. 
83 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 481, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) 
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973)).  The Warshak I court 
further noted that “it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s 
constitutional rights[.]”  Id. at 481–82. 
84 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 476 n.8, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  The 
court claimed the following: 
In neither instance is the government necessarily entitled to every e-
mail stored with the ISP, many of which are likely to be entirely 
unrelated to its specific investigation.  If the e-mails are seized 
pursuant to a warrant, the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement would necessitate that the scope of the search somehow 
be designed to target e-mails that could reasonably be believed to have 
some connection to the alleged crime being investigated. 
Id.  And similarly, for subpoenas, “where a subpoena or an SCA order compels the 
disclosure of e-mails, the demand must be reasonable in scope and relevance.”  Id. (quoting 
Doe, 253 F.3d at 263.  Both requirements are fact specific.  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2001)).  The searches should be narrowed to the “sender, 
recipient, date, relevant attachments, or keywords[]” and should be applied on a case by 
case basis.  Id. 
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Next, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
further contributed to section 2703 jurisprudence by finding, in United 
States v. Allen, that individuals hold no expectation of privacy in account 
information provided to ISPs, but do hold an expectation of privacy in 
the content of e-mails.85  The court found no privacy interest in the 
information that the government had obtained from an Internet Access 
Provider (“IAP”),86 Super Zippo, because the information consisted of 
data the defendant gave to employees, websites the defendant visited 
and no content from the defendant’s e-mail.87 
The procedural issue in Allen resulted because the IAP handed over 
the defendant’s information without first receiving a warrant from the 
government as required by section 2703.88  The government’s agent had 
asked Super Zippo whether it required a warrant to obtain the requested 
information, and the general counsel for the IAP replied in the 
negative.89  Therefore, because Super Zippo indicated that it did not 
require a warrant, the government did not obtain one.90  The court in 
Allen found that the government acted in good faith in light of the 
agent’s behavior, and noted that there appeared to be no reason why the 
evidence should not be admitted.91  Because the IAP did not demand a 
warrant, no seizure existed; therefore, no constitutional violation 
occurred.92  Thus, because the IAP willingly provided the requested 
                                                 
85 United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402 (C.A.A.F. 2000).  In Allen, appellant’s conviction 
consisted of anal sodomy, assault, conduct unbecoming of an officer, transporting and 
receiving child pornography, and soliciting his wife as a prostitute.  Id. at 403–04.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld the general court martial.  Id. 
at 410.  The court distinguishes itself from Maxwell, which prohibited access to contents of 
e-mails, by holding that Allen does not concern itself with communication at all and instead 
concerns itself with stored transactions that are recorded in a log format without 
accompanying text.  Id. at 409. 
86 See supra Part II.A (discussing the synonymy of IAPs and ISPs). 
87 Allen, 53 M.J. at 409.  Super Zippo, defendant’s IAP, handed over a log to the 
government that “identif[ied] the date, time, user, and detailed internet [sic] address of 
sites accessed by appellant over several months.”  Id. at 409.  The court reasoned that this 
information was covered by Title II of the ECPA because the list of websites did not 
constitute protected content as required under § 2703(c)(1)(A) in order to be protected.  Id. 
88 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006).  Section 2703(c) regulates access to subscriber information.  
Id.  In addition to a warrant, the government may obtain subscriber information by 
obtaining a court order, consent of the subscriber, or formal written request from a law 
enforcement agency concerning fraudulent allegations.  Id. 
89 Allen, 53 M.J. at 409. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  The court in Allen determined that if a warrant had been issued, the evidence 
would be admissible and, therefore, should be admitted because the government agent 
relied in good faith on the representation of Super Zippo’s legal counsel.  Id. 
92 Id. at 409–10.  Justice Sullivan in his concurrence noted that “the Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act does not require suppression for failure to comply with its 
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information, the court dismissed the section 2703 challenge in Allen, and 
the constitutionality question was once again avoided.93 
4. False Notions of E-Mail Privacy 
Applying this historical jurisprudence today, most courts, as in the 
cases discussed above, have held that most private-party e-mail 
                                                                                                             
provisions, absent a violation of a constitutional right.”  Id. (Sullivan, J. concurring).  See 
United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2007).  Additionally, a recent case from 
the D.C. District Court recognized § 2703 of the SCA as unconstitutional for its lack of an 
exclusionary provision.  Id.  In Ferguson, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 
suspected that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking, and it launched an 
investigation.  Id. at 8.  The government submitted, and the magistrate approved, two ex 
parte applications that compelled MSN and Yahoo! to hand over to government officials 
the e-mails of the defendant that were more than 180 days old.  Id.  The defendant 
requested to suppress the evidence and alleged that the SCA was unconstitutional because 
it lacked a suppression remedy.  Id.  This judicial opinion is less than two pages long and is 
not clear in its reasoning, but suggests that Warshak I previously declared the SCA to be 
unconstitutional.  See id.  See also Warshak I, 490 F.3d 455, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on 
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), 
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).  This interpretation is mistaken because Warshak I 
upheld the SCA and narrowly construed the injunction granted to exclude possible 
unconstitutional provisions regarding a facial challenge that had nothing to do with the 
lack of an exclusionary remedy.  See id.  See also Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 9.  In Ferguson, 
the court found that the government reasonably relied on the SCA because Acts of 
Congress are “entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality[]” and because until 
2006 in Warshak I, no court had ruled the SCA unconstitutional since its enactment in 1986.  
Id.  Therefore, in 2003, when the government applied for SCA orders in this case, there was 
no indication that the statute was unconstitutional.  Id.  Because the government complied 
with SCA’s standards, the court allowed the evidence.  Id.  Furthermore, the court held that 
“the Government’s reliance on the SCA was objectively reasonable.  Thus, the Court need 
not consider the constitutionality of the SCA.”  Id.  Oddly enough, two short paragraphs 
later, the court cited Smith, one lonely case that stated that “‘the Stored Communications 
Act does not provide an exclusion remedy.  It allows for civil damages . . . and criminal 
punishment . . . but nothing more.’”  Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 
1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original).  Thus, the question remains as to whether 
the lack of an exclusion remedy renders the entire SCA unconstitutional.  See id. 
93 Allen, 53 M.J. at 409.  In Allen, the court noted that suppression is not a remedy under 
the SCA, but that courts need to determine whether the accused (the individual whose 
account holder information was seized) had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id.  Also, 
the SCA “does not require suppression for failure to comply with its provisions, absent a 
violation of a constitutional right.”  Id. at 410 (Sullivan, J. concurring).  This reasoning leads 
one to believe that courts recognize that suppression is guaranteed under the Fourth 
Amendment but not under the SCA unless there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See 
also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422–23 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (barring electronic 
evidence that was illegally obtained and classified as fruit from the poisonous tree); 
Lawless, supra note 38, at 1 (stating that “[a]gainst the backdrop of this increased use of 
Internet search records used as criminal evidence, there is a corresponding void in privacy 
law:  there is no applicable statutory suppression remedy[]”). 
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correspondence is private, and thus constitutionally protected, because 
the user expects the content to be private.94  Furthermore, e-mail is one of 
the most popular mediums for communication, similar to telephones and 
letters in the past.95  ISPs house today’s virtual mailboxes.96  Even if an 
                                                 
94 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
95 Id.  The court analogized the constitutional protections given to telephone 
conversation content in Katz and found that those same protections should apply to e-mail.  
Id.  In addition, the Senate Report acknowledged that computers are becoming the 
exclusive medium for communication and record keeping: 
The Committee also recognizes that computers are used extensively 
today for the storage and processing of information.  With the advent 
of computerized recordkeeping systems, Americans have lost the 
ability to lock away a great deal of personal and business information.  
For example, physicians and hospitals maintain medical files in offsite 
data banks, businesses of all sizes transmit their records to remote 
computers to obtain sophisticated data processing services.  These 
services as well as the providers of electronic mail create electronic 
copies of private correspondence for later reference.  This information 
is processed for the benefit of the user but often it is maintained for 
approximately 3 months to ensure system integrity.  For the person or 
business whose records are involved, the privacy or proprietary 
interest in that information should not change.  
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986).  The Report further acknowledged that the law prior to the 
ECPA would likely not protect the above mentioned records and that the purpose of the 
ECPA was to remedy this situation.  Id.  See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 27, Warshak v. 
United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007).  Additionally, e-mail is granted the same 
privacy rights as sealed containers.  Id.  “In recent years, email has become the preferred 
medium of written communication for millions of Americans, revolutionizing the form in 
which individuals communicate to each other their thoughts, ideas, beliefs, hopes, dreams, 
and fears and becoming the backbone of the country’s communication system.”  Id.  
Furthermore, “Emails are ‘closed containers’ which may not be searched without a 
warrant.”  Id. at 29.  The Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief in Warshak I continued by explaining 
how e-mails are similar to closed containers.  Id. at 30–31. 
96 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 27, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 
11, 2007).  In his final brief, Warshak argued as follows: 
Emails stored on an ISP’s server are a form of closed container.  The 
contents of an email are not visible to the naked eye; instead, several 
intrusive searches must occur before the contents may be read.  One 
seeking to view the contents of an ISP-stored email must first gain 
access to that portion of the ISP’s server that houses the subscriber’s 
email; this is a search in and of itself.  Even after one gains access to the 
a [sic] subscriber’s virtual mailbox, the content of those emails remain 
[sic] shielded from public view, much like the content of letters sitting 
in a “real” mailbox.  To view the contents of an email, another 
physically intrusive act is necessary:  the email must be unsealed 
through the operation of a computer function such as clicking on the 
email using a mouse or using the computer’s “open” function, an act 
doctrinally indistinguishable from the act of opening a sealed letter or 
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ISP contracts for a right to access a user’s e-mail “in the ordinary course 
of business,” this access does not waive a user’s expectation of privacy.97  
Therefore, in light of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts will 
likely continue to hold that individuals have an expectation of privacy 
regarding their e-mail.98  Courts have discussed account holder 
expectations in more detail with regard to server policies. 
5. Reasonable v. Unreasonable Expectations:  Marking the Bounds 
Two cases decided by the United States Courts of Appeals, 
regarding the impact of Fourth Amendment expectations of e-mail 
privacy in view of school or organizational server policies, merit brief 
                                                                                                             
package or unlocking a closed footlocker.  [Therefore], ISP-stored 
emails are entitled to protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . . 
Id. at *30–31 (internal citation omitted).  See Dempsey, supra note 26, at 421.  Dempsey also 
used the storage locker analogy:  “[w]hen an individual stores personal property with a 
third party, the owner of the property retains a privacy interest in the stored items, 
meaning that a warrant would be required to search the storage space.”  Id.  See Robert M. 
Goldstein & Martin G. Weinberg, The Stored Communications Act and Private E-mail 
Communications, CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 19–20.  Finally, Warshak’s attorneys authored an 
article discussing the SCA, and drew an interesting conclusion when comparing sealed 
containers, letters, and e-mails.  Id.  The authors described an e-mail as having more 
privacy aspects than a traditional letter because 
the owner of the e-mail can repossess a read-and-then-closed e-mail at 
any moment, without any notice or permission from the ISP.  The 
owner of the e-mail can delete it from the mailbox, or do whatever he 
or she wants to do with the e-mail.  It is, for all purposes, in that 
person’s possession, dominion, and control at all times.  Consequently, 
if there is any difference, the privacy interests should be greater in the 
context of e-mail than in the traditional carrier paradigm[] . . . . 
Id. 
97 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).  See supra note 29 (discussing the facts 
of Miller).  See also United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).  Miller 
requires that access to a user’s e-mail must occur in the ordinary course of business and 
where university policies that provide for limited e-mail monitoring do not satisfy the 
ordinary course of business requirement.  See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 
at 1147.  See also Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473–74, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-
4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. 
OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(Warshak III).  Essentially, where user contracts for e-mail and ISP policies are in place, 
unless those contracts and policies allow greater than limited access and the government 
can prove that regular monitoring occurs, policies will be ineffective in proving that 
content is scanned by persons in the ordinary course of business.  Id. 
98 See JOHNSON, supra note 18 (demonstrating that even lawyers recognize privacy of e-
mail correspondence and how it can help in assisting clients).  Johnson stated that, for 
practical purposes, “e-mail should be considered as secure as many other common means 
of communication, such as phone calls, faxes, the U.S. mail, and express delivery services.”  
Id. at xvii. 
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attention.99  Exemplifying the two extremes that mark the constitutional 
bounds for obtaining e-mails, United States v. Simons and United States v. 
Heckenkamp, discuss expected privacy interests of server users.100 
In Simons, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a 
Foreign Bureau of Information Services (“FBIS”) engineer had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy on a work computer because the 
agency had a policy that allowed auditing of work computers and had 
notified the engineer of this policy.101  The court determined that the 
policy eliminated the engineer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.102  
According to the court, whether Plaintiff Mark Simons believed he was 
entitled to privacy was not relevant because the FBIS’s policy objectively 
forewarned him that he was not.103  The Simons court was one of the first 
                                                 
99 See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000); Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142. 
100 Simons, 206 F.3d 392; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142.  See 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra 
note 1, § 13.  An e-mail policy “should be clear, concise, and aimed at responsible use of e-
mail, in order to gain acceptance throughout the company.  The policy should be consistent 
with other company policies, such as access to and use of company facilities and property.”  
Id. 
101 Simons, 206 F.3d at 398.  The FBIS policy explained that FBIS would conduct electronic 
audits according to the following guidelines to ensure compliance with its internet usage 
policy: 
Audits.  Electronic auditing shall be implemented within all FBIS 
unclassified networks that connect to the Internet or other publicly 
accessible networks to support identification, termination, and 
prosecution of unauthorized activity.  These electronic audit 
mechanisms shall . . . be capable of recording: 
• Access to the system, including successful and failed login 
attempts, and logouts; 
• Inbound and outbound file transfers; 
• Terminal connections (telnet) to and from external systems; 
• Sent and received e-mail messages; 
• Web sites visited, including uniform resource locator (URL) 
of pages retrieved; 
• Date, Time, and user associated with each event. 
Id. at 395–96.  The policy also informed users that FBIS would periodically “audit, inspect, 
and/or monitor” user accounts when it deemed proper.  Id. at 396.  Defendant Simons’s 
account fell under suspicion when a network manager noticed a number of hits for the 
word “sex” originating from Simons’s computer.  Id.  Further investigation led FBIS to find 
that the websites that Simons visited contained nude pictures and that he had saved over 
one-thousand of such pictures and files on his computer.  Id. 
102 Id. at 398.  “We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate 
his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet.”  Id. 
103 Id.  “[R]egardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred 
from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS 
notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use.”  Id. (citing Am. Postal Workers 
Union v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
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to examine employer e-mail privacy policies.104  In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that organizational server policies do not negate an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.105 
In Heckenkamp, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
attaching one’s computer to the University of Wisconsin’s network did 
not waive a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy.106  Indeed, 
Heckenkamp illuminated the need for section 2703 of the SCA.107  In 
Heckenkamp, immediately after the University of Wisconsin determined 
that a student had misused the computer she had attached to the school’s 
network, school officials disconnected the student’s computer from the 
network and confiscated it without a warrant.108  The Heckenkamp court 
distinguished the facts in Heckenkamp from those in Simons because, in 
Heckenkamp, the University of Wisconsin did not have an announced 
screening or monitoring policy in effect, and, in fact, the server policy 
that was in place led users to believe that their accounts were private.109  
Therefore, as shown by the divergent outcomes in Simons and 
Heckenkamp, an organization’s internet server policy may not effectively 
                                                 
104 Id. at 392.  See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007).  The other 
extreme is exhibited in the Ninth Circuit by Heckenkamp.  Id. 
105 Id. at 1147.  The court held that there is no single factor that establishes that a place is 
free from warrantless government intrusion.  Id. at 1146.  However, the court noted that 
people generally have a heightened expectation of privacy on their home computers and in 
their password protected files.  Id. 
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy may be diminished in 
“transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have [sic] already 
arrived at the recipient.”  However, the mere act of accessing a 
network does not in itself extinguish privacy expectations, nor does the 
fact that others may have occasional access to the computer. 
Id. at 1146–47 (quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
106 Id. at 1146. 
107 Id.  In Heckenkamp, a University of Wisconsin student hacked into the main computer 
network and gained access to the university e-mail system.  Id. at 1143.  The student had 
been fired from the school’s computer help desk for “similar unauthorized activity,” which 
in turn justified the administrator’s concern that Defendant Heckenkamp had the 
knowledge to actually cause harm.  Id. at 1144.  Since this happened during the period of 
final examinations, the university’s computer network investigator noted that a disruption 
to the university would be “tremendous if e-mail was destroyed.”  Id. 
108 Id. at 1145. 
109 Id. at 1147.  The school policy required that 
“[i]n general, all computer and electronic files should be free from 
access by any but the authorized users of those files.  Exceptions to this 
basic principle shall be kept to a minimum and made only where 
essential to . . . protect the integrity of the University and the rights 
and property of the state.” 
Id. (alterations in original).  The school’s policy in Heckenkamp, therefore, actually gave the 
user a heightened expectation of privacy.  Id. 
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eliminate the expectations of privacy that individuals have when 
accessing an organization’s server.110 
Laws governing electronic communications under the SCA 
specifically regulate e-mail evidentiary procedures with respect to third 
party ISPs.111  This Note addresses the likely occurrence of an 
unconstitutional search and seizure pursuant to sections 2703, 2704, and 
2705 of the SCA. 
C.  Sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the Stored Communications Act112 
The SCA, which, as mentioned previously is also known as Title II of 
the ECPA, provides the government power with which it can access 
customer communication records from third-party service providers.113  
In 1986, Congress enacted the following Titles of the ECPA:  Title I 
applies to “interception of communications and related matters”;114 Title 
II relates to “stored wire and electronic communications and 
transactional records access”;115 and Title III discusses “pen registers.”116  
                                                 
110  Simons, 206 F.3d at 398–99; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1147.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit explained in Simons that the FBIS’s Internet policy diminished Simons’s 
legitimate expectation of privacy.  206 F.3d at 398–99.  Additionally, Simons never asserted 
that he was unaware of the Internet policy.  Id. at 399 n.8.  Conversely, in Heckenkamp, even 
though a policy existed and stated that certain users may access his account, University 
policies considered, in their entirety, did not diminish Heckenkamp’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy.  482 F.3d at 1147. 
111 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701–12, 3117, 3121–
27 (2006). 
112 See The ECPA, ISPs & Obtaining E-mail:  A Primer for Local Prosecutors, APRI, July 
2005, at 25, available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ecpa_isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf.  
Two threshold questions when evaluating anything under the ECPA are as follows:  one, 
“Does the provider offer e-mail services to the public?”; and two, “Is the law enforcement 
agency seeking e-mail content?”  Id. 
113 Id. at 9.  The ECPA does not define governmental entities and neither have courts.  Id. 
114 H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. § 1 (1986).  The purpose of the ECPA was to 
amend[] title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968—the Federal wiretap law—to protect against the unauthorized 
interception of electronic communications.  The bill amends the 1968 
law to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in 
light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications 
technologies. 
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986).  See also THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, 
CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO PAPERS, RECORDS, AND COMMUNICATIONS:  
WHAT INFORMATION CAN THE GOVERNMENT GET ABOUT YOU, AND HOW CAN THEY GET IT? 
(2006), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/govaccess/govaccesschart.pdf; http://www.cdt.org 
/wiretap/govaccess/govaccesschart-11x17.pdf (presenting more information about 
current legal standards, regarding access to papers, records, and communications, and 
presenting two charts mapping accessibility of documents, burdens, and levels of privacy 
protection). 
115 H.R. 4952. 
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This Note specifically addresses Title II, which attempts to balance the 
privacy interests of both citizens and law enforcement agencies.117  The 
purpose of the SCA was to update existing wiretapping law to account 
for new forms of communications, such as e-mail.118  Two sections of the 
SCA were recently subjects of litigation in district courts because of the 
provisions that address lack of notice and delayed notice when gathering 
the contents of e-mails.119  Parts II.C.1–2 discuss these sections of the 
SCA.120 
1.  Section 2703:  Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or 
Records121 
Section 2703 of the SCA governs disclosure of customer 
communications and records.122  Section 2703 provides that the 
government may obtain general account holder information123 via 
                                                                                                             
116 Id. 
117 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1.  See Robert S. Steere, Keeping “Private E-mail” Private:  A 
Proposal to Modify the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 264–74 
(1998) (Titles I and II of the ECPA should be clarified because of the very fine distinctions 
between stored communications and transit communications).  See also Pikowsky, supra note 
11.  Another proposed solution arguing for clarification has been to address all 
communications—telephone, postal mail, e-mail—in one statute, and therefore provide 
consistency and incorporate emerging technologies at the same time.  Id.  (stating that “the 
statutes should be amended to provide the same protection against surreptitious access to 
stored communications, regardless of whether that communication is stored in a person’s 
mailbox at an Internet Service Provider, in a personal computer located in a house, or in a 
file cabinet in an office[]”). 
118 132 CONG. REC. 4039 (1986). 
119 See Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other 
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified 
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III); United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2007). 
120 See infra Parts II.C.1–3 (discussing the sections of the SCA governing disclosure of e-
mail by third party service providers, backup preservation, and delayed notice to account 
holders). 
121 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
122 Id. (noting that section 2703 of the SCA is titled, “Required disclosure of customer 
communications or records”).  
123 Id. § 2703(c)(2).  Such general account information held by remote electronic 
computing services that must be disclosed to a governmental entity includes 
(A) name; 
(B) address; 
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session 
times and durations; 
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; 
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, 
including any temporarily assigned network address; and 
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warrant, court order, consent of the subscriber or customer, submission 
of a formal request by the governmental entity investigating, or 
administrative subpoena.124  Furthermore, the government may obtain 
the actual content of e-mail communication with or without providing 
notice to the subscriber.125  Section 2703 distinguishes between e-mails 
that are more than 180 days old and those that are equal to and less than 
180 days old, the latter being harder to obtain.126  The governmental 
                                                                                                             
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or 
bank account number)[.] 
Id. 
124 Id. § 2703(c)(1).  The SCA specifically states that information may be obtained when 
the governmental entity 
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent State warrant; 
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; 
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; 
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation 
concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a 
subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is 
engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title); or 
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2). 
Id. § 2703(c)(1).  The information may be obtained under § 2703(c)(2) “of a subscriber to or 
customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena 
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial 
subpoena . . . .”  Id. § 2703(c)(2).  See H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007); infra note 146.  A bill is 
currently before Congress that will allow the governmental entity to obtain information 
while investigating the disappearance of a subscriber when the subscriber is either a minor, 
or if there is likely to be suffering and a guardian, spouse, or parent has consented.  H.R. 
3156, 110th Cong. (2007); infra note 146 (text of proposed bill). 
125 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
126 Id. § 2703(a)–(b).  The statute reads: 
(a) Contents of Wire of Electronic Communications in Electronic 
Storage.—A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or 
less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described 
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction 
over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant.  A 
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and 
eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in a Remote 
Computing Service.—(1) A governmental entity may require a 
provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any 
wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made 
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection— 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6
2009] E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment 701 
entity seeking the information may obtain the contents of wire or 
electronic communication without notice if it obtains a warrant.127  
Furthermore, the government may obtain information with prior notice 
by an administrative subpoena or court order.128  Legal theorists and 
courts have questioned the constitutionality of administrative subpoenas 
and court orders, claiming that they do not satisfy the probable cause 
standard required by the Fourth Amendment.129  Administrative 
subpoenas require only a reasonable relevance standard, whereas actual 
warrants require a showing of probable cause under the Fourth 
Amendment.130  Although legal theorists and courts have exhausted this 
issue, this Note narrows its focus to the unconstitutional disparity of 
existing safeguards for e-mail privacy and the likelihood that Fourth 
Amendment violations will occur.131 
                                                                                                             
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the 
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation 
or equivalent State warrant; or 
(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the 
subscriber or customer if the governmental entity— 
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal 
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial 
subpoena; or 
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection 
(d) of this section; except that delayed notice may be given 
pursuant to section 2705 of this title. 
Id.  It has been suggested that it “makes no sense” to distinguish between e-mails greater or 
less than 180 days old because all e-mails should be treated the same.  Final Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellee at 42 n.18, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007); 
see also infra notes 208−13 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Plaintiff Warshak argued: 
A year-old email is no less worthy of Fourth Amendment protection 
than is a day-old one, and permitting the seizure of a 181-day old 
email via §2703 orders or subpoenas but requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause for a 179-day old one is a distinction without 
constitutional foundation or principle. 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 42 n.18, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 
2007). 
127 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.  The warrant must be issued pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure “by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent State warrant.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).   
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); supra note 126. 
129 See Steinberg, supra note 9, at 478 (noting that court orders require “far less rigorous 
proof than the probable cause standard for a Fourth Amendment warrant[]”).  See also U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
130 Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2001); see also supra note 78 
(discussing the reasonable relevance test). 
131 See Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on 
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), 
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2. Section 2704:  Backup Preservation132 
The SCA provides the government with a security blanket in section 
2704 by requiring ISPs to backup user accounts when the government 
makes such a request.133  This provides the government with an excellent 
opportunity to secure evidence because backup preservation pursuant to 
section 2703(b)(2) does not require the government to provide the user 
with immediate notice.134  Therefore, the government may, without 
notifying the account holder, have the ISP backup the account until the 
                                                                                                             
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (noting that the government typically argues that 
court orders issued under section 2703 of the SCA are akin to subpoenas, which require 
only a showing of reasonable relevance).  See also Doe, 253 F.3d at 263–64.  The 
reasonableness standard is applied to subpoenas, whereas actual warrants require a 
showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  A warrant can be 
distinguished from a subpoena by the level of intrusiveness of the seizure.  Id. at 264.  
Whereas a warrant is classified to have immediate intrusiveness, an order or administrative 
subpoena may be contested in federal court through a motion to suppress, thereby being 
less intrusive.  Id.  See also Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-mail “Warrants”:  
Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1610–11 (2004).  Ohm 
contended that there is a growing chasm between privacy and freedom.  Id. at 1599.  
Furthermore, he predicted that lowering the standards the government has to meet to 
obtain a SCA warrant may simultaneously lower the standards for obtaining physical 
search warrants as well.  Id. at 1613.  Evidence suggests that Ohm’s prediction is true in 
situations where warrants may be served via fax to the ISP, and then the ISP performs the 
search without supervision of a police officer.  Id. at 1610–11.  Ohm stated that these 
warrants granting unsupervised searches are not search warrants at all, and the problem 
arises where the accused does not even know that his inbox has been searched.  Id.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1).  All the government needs to do is contact the ISP with the account 
information that it wants backed up and the ISP must comply with the government’s 
request within two business days.  Id.  See id. § 2704(a)(4).  Then, fourteen days after notice 
to the subscriber, the government may obtain access to the backed up copy if the subscriber 
has neither objected nor initiated proceedings against the government.  Id. § 2704(a)(5).  To 
satisfy its burden to justify e-mail back-up, the government must only demonstrate that it 
has a reason to believe that notification to the subscriber will result in destruction of e-
mails; if it shows this, the backup preservation shall be authorized.  Id.  See id. § 2704(b)(1)–
(5).  The SCA grants proper remedies to subscribers in cases where subscribers may file a 
motion to vacate or quash subpoena.  Id.  Section 2704(b) of the SCA explicitly establishes 
procedures for challenging a backup and provides instructions for judges concerning when 
to grant and deny such motions.  Id. 
132 18 U.S.C. § 2704. 
133 Id.  “A governmental entity . . . may include in its subpoena or court order a 
requirement that the service provider to whom the request is directed create a backup copy 
of the contents of the electronic communications sought in order to preserve those 
communications.”  Id. § 2704(a)(1). 
134 Id. § 2704.  “Without notifying the subscriber or customer . . . such service provider 
shall create such backup copy as soon as practicable consistent with its regular business 
practices and shall confirm to the governmental entity that such backup copy has been 
made.”  Id. § 2704(a)(1). 
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government can meet its burden to show cause for obtaining the 
contents.135  Notice is provided to the account holder at the government’s 
discretion because the delayed notice provision of section 2705 applies to 
backup preservation.136  This Note examines delayed notice, one of the 
open-ended provisions of the SCA that can easily violate Fourth 
Amendment guarantees of privacy.137 
3. Section 2705:  Delayed Notice 
Rules almost always come with exceptions, and section 2703 is not 
unique in this respect.  Specifically, section 2703 states that when the 
government requests an account holder’s information from an ISP, the 
government must notify the account holder of the request, but section 
2703 also stipulates that this notice may be delayed for e-mail content 
gained by an administrative subpoena or court order.138  This 
problematic exception is defined in section 2705, which provides that the 
government may elect to delay notification to the account holder for up 
to ninety days.139  Furthermore, this delayed notice of ninety days may 
be continuously extended in ninety day increments if the government 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Id. § 2704(a)(2).  The government has three days to notify the subscriber after backup 
is confirmed by the ISP under section 2704.  Id.  However, the government can choose to 
use the delayed notice provision and then notice can be technically delayed for extended 
amounts of time.  Id. § 2705.  See infra note 140 (citing to the SCA provision extending 
delayed notice length—section 2705(a)). 
137 See infra Part III.C.3. 
138 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006). 
139 See supra note 126 (citing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)).  See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a).  
Section 2703 provides as follows: 
(1) A governmental entity acting under section 2703(b) of this title 
may— 
(A) where a court order is sought, include in the application a 
request, which the court shall grant, for an order delaying the 
notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for a period 
not to exceed ninety days, if the court determines that there is 
reason to believe that notification of the existence of the court order 
may have an adverse result described in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection; or 
(B) where an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or 
State statute or a Federal or State grand jury subpoena is obtained, 
delay the notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for 
a period not to exceed ninety days upon the execution of a written 
certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe 
that notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an 
adverse result described in paragraph (2) of this subsection. 
Id. 
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submits the proper request for the court to grant such exception.140  
Therefore, theoretically, if continuous extensions are granted, the 
government may lawfully obtain the content of an individual’s e-mail 
without any notification to that individual for an unlimited amount of 
time.141  The drafters of section 2705 of the SCA claim that the only time 
this scenario could possibly take place is when an “adverse effect” is 
likely.142  Consequently, this delay provision leaves open the possibility 
that individuals do not have the opportunity to refute seizures that may 
be unlawful before Fourth Amendment violations occur.143  Congress has 
                                                 
140 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(4).  This delayed notice exception specifically provides that 
“[e]xtensions of the delay of notification provided in section 2703 of up to ninety days each 
may be granted by the court upon application, or by certification by a governmental entity, 
but only in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.”  Id.  See id. 2705(a)(5).  Upon 
expiration of the extension, the government must inform the subscriber of specific 
investigation details.  Id.  Section 2705(a)(5) specifically states: 
Upon expiration of the period of delay of notification under paragraph 
(1) or (4) of this subsection, the governmental entity shall serve upon, 
or deliver by registered or first-class mail to, the customer or 
subscriber a copy of the process or request together with notice that— 
(A) states with reasonable specificity the nature of the law 
enforcement inquiry; and 
(B) informs such customer or subscriber— 
(i) that information maintained for such customer or 
subscriber by the service provider named in such process 
or request was supplied to or requested by that 
governmental authority and the date on which the 
supplying or request took place; 
(ii) that notification of such customer or subscriber was 
delayed; 
(iii) what governmental entity or court made the 
certification or determination pursuant to which that 
delay was made; and 
(iv) which provision of this chapter allowed such delay. 
Id. 
141 Id. § 2705(a)(4) (granting continuous extensions). 
142 Id. § 2705(a)(2).  The SCA defines adverse effect as “(A) endangering the life or 
physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or 
tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously 
jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.”  Id. 
143 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 44, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092  (6th Cir. Jan. 
11, 2007).  See infra text accompanying note 172 (acknowledging the problem with delayed 
notice).  Warshak’s brief discussed 
[T]he unconstitutional synergy of §§2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), 2703(d), and 2705, 
which, in conjunction, allow the government to secretly seize and 
search the entirety of an individuals’ private email correspondence and 
to affirmatively prevent the individual from learning of the intrusion at 
a point at which he could lodge a judicial challenge in advance of the 
seizure.  In the administrative/grand jury subpoena context, while 
notice to the target of the subpoena may not be required by the Fourth 
Amendment, the fact remains that, where, as is often the case, the 
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proposed an amendment to the SCA; however, the proposed 
amendment attempts to “clarify [only] ongoing scope[s] . . . and 
warrants,” but fails to address delayed notice or the lack of supervised 
seizures.144 
4. Congress’s Proposed Amendment 
On July 24, 2007, just over one month after the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit decided Warshak I, Congress proposed a bill intended to 
revamp section 2703 of the SCA.145  Essentially, the important proposed 
changes include further defining the circumstances in which a 
governmental entity may require an ISP to divulge account information 
and clarifying the appropriate circumstances that lend themselves to 
requirements for a warrant and court order.146  As discussed previously, 
                                                                                                             
target learns of the subpoena, he has the ability to move to quash it.  In 
the §2703 context, however, notice to the account holder is prohibited, 
thus affirmatively denying him any chance to protect his rights in 
advance of disclosure. 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 44. 
144 H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007). 
145 Id.  The bill proposed by Congress to amend the SCA is currently before the House 
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.  Id.  See Warshak v. United 
States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 
06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 
(S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(Warshak III) (granting Plaintiff injunction barring government from seeking any further e-
mails without notice to Plaintiff). 
146 H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007).  The proposed bill reads: 
‘(h)(1) In General- A court order under subsection (d) or a warrant 
under subsection (c)(1)(A) may require that records or other 
information (not including the contents of communications) be 
disclosed to a governmental entity on an ongoing basis. 
‘(2) Standard- The court shall issue an order or warrant 
requiring such ongoing disclosure if-- 
‘(A) in the case of a court order under subsection (d), the 
court finds that the application contains specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the records or other information (not 
including the contents of communications) will be relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation; or 
‘(B) in the case of a warrant under subsection (c)(1)(A), the 
court finds that probable cause supports issuing the warrant. 
‘(3) Duration- An order or warrant requiring ongoing disclosure 
under this subsection may require ongoing disclosure for a 
period not to exceed 60 days.  Extensions of such an order or 
warrant may be granted, but only upon an application for an 
extension under this subsection and upon the judicial 
finding required by paragraph (2).  The period of extension 
shall be for a period not to exceed 60 days. 
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‘(4) Nondisclosure- An order or warrant requiring ongoing 
disclosure under this subsection shall direct that-- 
‘(A) the order or warrant be sealed until otherwise ordered 
by the court; and 
‘(B) the person or entity who is obligated by the order or 
warrant to disclose records or other information on an 
ongoing basis to the applicant shall not disclose the existence 
of the order or warrant or the existence of the investigation 
to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the 
court. 
‘(5) Scope and Assistance-  
‘(A) IN GENERAL- An order or warrant requiring ongoing 
disclosure under this subsection, upon service of that order 
or warrant, shall apply to any person or entity providing 
wire or electronic communication service or remote 
computing service in the United States whose assistance 
may facilitate the execution of the order or warrant.  
Whenever such an order or warrant is served on any person 
or entity not specifically named in the order or warrant, 
upon request of such person or entity, the attorney for the 
Government or law enforcement or investigative officer that 
is serving the order or warrant shall provide written or 
electronic certification that the order or warrant applies to 
the person or entity being served. 
‘(B) INFORMATION PROVIDED- Upon the request of an 
attorney for the Government or an officer of a law 
enforcement agency authorized to receive the results of an 
order or warrant requiring ongoing disclosure under this 
subsection, a provider of a wire or electronic communication 
service or a provider of remote computing services shall 
furnish such investigative or law enforcement officer all 
information, facilities, technical, and other assistance 
including execution of such warrant or order unobtrusively 
and with no more interference with the services that the 
person so ordered by the court accords the party with 
respect to whom the warrant or order pertains than is 
necessary to effect the disclosure required under the warrant 
or order, if such installation and assistance is directed by a 
court.  Unless otherwise ordered by the court, records or 
other information disclosed under such warrant or order 
shall be furnished to the officer of a law enforcement agency 
designated in the court order, at reasonable intervals during 
regular business hours for the duration of the order.  
Pursuant to section 2522, an order may be issued to enforce 
the assistance capability and capacity requirements under 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. 
‘(6) Nonexclusivity- Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a 
governmental entity from requiring or receiving the 
production on an ongoing basis of records or other 
information (not including the contents of communications) 
with consent of the subscriber or user, or under any other 
lawful authority.’ 
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courts have addressed the warrant/court order issue relating to whether 
the probable cause standard is met under the Fourth Amendment over 
and over, and Congress’s proposed amendment could cure this problem. 
Courts have not yet decided whether sections 2703 and 2705 of the 
SCA are unconstitutional in view of their provisions for renewed 
delayed notice and lessened evidentiary burdens compounded by 
section 2704’s backup requirement.  Keeping this in mind, Part III 
analyzes current safeguards in place for disclosure and backup as 
described in sections 2703 and 2704 to protect both the government and 
the subscribers, and Part IV suggests the proper approach for tailoring 
both these safeguards and section 2705 to achieve an outcome that 
complies with the Fourth Amendment. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT AS APPLIED TO 
GOVERNMENT REQUESTS FOR E-MAIL 
The question is not what the statute authorizes, but what the Constitution 
requires.147 
 
The United States Constitution requires lawmakers to pass statutes 
that fall within legitimate, constitutional parameters.  The transition of 
stored data from home computers and filing cabinets to Internet 
databases, including ISPs, should not mitigate individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.148  As one scholar pointed out, 
Over 200 years ago, the founders of our country took 
strong steps to permanently and finally end the 
authority of the government to conduct wholesale 
surveillance [on] the private communications and 
thoughts [of] ordinary Americans.  The question for us 
today is whether we’re going to give up on that 
                                                                                                             
 . . . . 
H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007) (setting forth proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2703). 
147 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 41, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 
11, 2007). 
148 Jonathan Zittrain, Search and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
83, 90 (2005) (discussing the current trend to store data with “faraway third parties” and 
noting that this “should not entail a complete stripping of Fourth Amendment interests in 
having that data secure from unreasonable government intrusion[]”). 
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American ideal, or whether we’re going to take the steps 
necessary to return to it.149 
The decisions of Katz and Smith provide the foundation for 
evaluating electronic communications.150  Because e-mail evidentiary 
issues are analogous to telephone calls and e-mails likely retain an even 
higher expectation of privacy than telephone communications because e-
mails are more similar to written letters, heightened privacy protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment should apply to e-mails.151 
Part III.A analyzes the constitutional problems presented by sections 
2703, 2704, and 2705 by focusing on the overwhelming power granted to 
the government and the comparatively minimal protection against 
privacy invasion provided to e-mail account holders.152  Next, Part III.B 
examines the current jurisprudential trend to veer away from 
interpreting the SCA, focusing on decisions by United States district 
courts that have interpreted the SCA in the context of e-mail seizure 
problems.153  The fundamental question presented, then, is whether the 
SCA, including Congress’s proposed amendment to the SCA, provides 
so much power to the government that individual account holders’ 
Fourth Amendment rights to privacy are violated. 
A. A Perfect Storm:  Fourth Amendment Violations Presented by Sections 
2703 and 2705 
The expectation of privacy that individuals believe they have when 
typing an e-mail and saving it as a draft or sending it to a recipient may 
be easily violated, considering the overwhelming number of provisions 
in the SCA that allows the government to override an individual’s right 
to privacy in e-mails.154  E-mail has become the preferred medium of 
                                                 
149 See Snyder, supra note 10 (“[A]side from the technology, the government’s ongoing 
violation of fundamental civil liberties would have been very familiar to the men who 
gathered in 1791 to adopt the Bill of Rights.”). 
150 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Katz and Smith and the initial reaction by the Supreme 
Court in respect to seizing electronic communications). 
151 See supra Part II.B; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the two 
questions presented in Smith for determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists). 
152 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problematic interaction of the above mentioned SCA 
provisions). 
153 See infra Part III.B (analyzing problems faced by the judiciary due to the confusing 
application of the SCA). 
154 See supra Part II.C.; c.f. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 475.  Steinberg notes that the battle 
line is drawn where some theorists favor judicial decisions over statutory regulations in 
regard to “sense-enhanced searches.”  Id.  Steinberg further states that “[s]cholars favoring 
regulation through the Fourth Amendment emphasize the accessibility of Fourth 
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communication in today’s world.155  The first problem arises because 
section 2703 allows the government to obtain an account holder’s 
account information without providing notice to the account holder.156  
The next issue arises because of the variety of methods that exist for 
obtaining e-mail contents without providing notice to account holders 
and delaying notice for lengthy periods of time.157  ISP employees 
certainly have the potential to rummage through the private e-mail of 
individual account holders.158  Last, the backup preservation option 
available to the government under section 2704 should be enough to 
permit the government to secure any desired evidence without using 
more intrusive options.159  All of these conditions combined create great 
potential for Fourth Amendment violations. 
The backup provision under the SCA is one of the government’s 
greatest powers in providing insurance against evidence destruction.160  
As if this is not enough, the government also has the power to delay 
notice to account holders under the backup provision.161  Therefore, even 
though a backup file of electronic evidence is created, if the government 
believes that notice to the subscriber could still result in the destruction 
of this evidence, it may extend the delay of notice for ninety day 
increments.162  The original period of delayed notice appropriately gives 
the government ninety days to sort out its case, but a constitutional 
problem results when the renewals of the ninety day delays are 
granted.163  In addition, problems have resulted where the government 
failed to renew its request for delayed notice, leading to periods as long 
                                                                                                             
Amendment doctrine and the complexity of statutes.  Scholars favoring regulation by 
statutes emphasize the specificity of statutory law and the vagueness of Fourth 
Amendment standards.”  Id. 
155 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (discussing how e-mail contains the 
same privacy expectations as letters and closed containers). 
156 See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (discussing procedures the government 
must follow when obtaining account holder information). 
157 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the delayed notice provision). 
158 See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential for privacy 
breaches during searches). 
159 See supra note 132.  See infra note 197 and accompanying text.  As an additional 
evidential safeguard, the emerging hard disk recovery technology is also available.  Id. 
160 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing statutory requirements that the government must 
meet before requesting to backup a user’s e-mail). 
161 18 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(2) (2006). 
162 See Swartz & Johnson, supra note 20.  The reasoning for this extension stems from the 
varying lengths of e-mail preservation by ISPs themselves.  Id.  See supra note 136 
(discussing the applicability of the delayed notice provision to the backup provision). 
163 See supra Part II.3 (discussing the delayed notice provision of section 2703 of the SCA). 
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as twelve months without governmental notification to the user 
regarding the seizure.164 
Section 2705 addresses renewals for delay of notice.165  The 
problematic aspect of delayed notice is that it applies to the most 
intrusive part of the SCA—government requests to obtain contents of e-
mail as provided by section 2703.166  Traditionally, governmental entities 
have provided notice of searches involving paper documents 
contemporaneously and not retroactively, and e-mail should be treated 
similarly due to its increasing role in displacing paper documents.167  At 
first blush, the delayed notice provision seems to provide for only a 
ninety day extension.168  However, closer observation reveals that the 
government may be granted extensions of up to ninety days in 
accordance with section 2705.169  More specifically, the subsection of 
section 2705 that addresses preclusion of notice—the provision that 
allows the government to forego notifying account holders that it has 
seized the account holder’s records—gives the government an 
opportunity to petition the court for a period of time that is “deemed 
appropriate” to refrain from notifying the account subscriber that the 
government is reading the subscriber’s e-mail.170  Theoretically, this 
could be for an infinite period of time. 
Upon expiration of the delayed notice period, the government must 
inform the subscriber of the nature of government contact with the ISP, 
including information about the delayed notification and details of the 
court ordered delay.171  The problem with delayed and precluded notice 
is that by the time the subscriber finds out about the seizure, it is too late 
                                                 
164  Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on 
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), 
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). 
165 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing provisions of section 2705 of the SCA). 
166 See Pikowsky, supra note 11, at 27–28 (discussing the problems with retrospective 
notice issues).  Pikowsky confirmed that retrospective searches are less invasive than 
prospective searches.  Id. 
167 Id. at 29.  Pikowsky observed: 
[W]here the police secretly copy files from a person’s mailbox at his 
ISP or covertly break into a person’s office to copy files from his 
personal computer, the privacy interest at stake is as great as a 
person’s privacy interest in his telephone calls.  Therefore, the 
protections of that privacy interest should be the same. 
Id. 
168 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(A) (2006). 
169 Id. §§ 2705(a)(4), 2705(b). 
170 Id. § 2705(b). 
171 See supra note 140 (discussing procedures of notification upon expiration of sealed 
notice). 
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for the person to correct violations of his or her privacy.172  The 
government can obtain important information from e-mails other than 
just the content of the message, such as date, time, sender, and receiver 
information.173  This could result in additional leads and information that 
may be allowed as evidence which would never have been obtained but 
for the violation of the privacy interest a user has in his e-mail account.174  
The next problematic provision of the SCA that has the potential of 
violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights involves the way 
that e-mail contents are obtained without official supervision.175 
It is true that the Fourth Amendment does not require supervision of 
searches where civilian searches may be more reasonable than searches 
performed by police officers.176  In fact, some situations, such as body 
cavity searches, present an example where privacy is greater outside the 
presence of an officer.177  However, some people argue that an e-mail 
                                                 
172 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the SCA’s delayed notice provision). 
173 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 1, at § 1. 
Other aspects of the electronic information that are not considered part 
of the body or context of a message or file, but can be of immense 
importance, include date and time stamps reflecting the date of saving 
or transmission and the date of receipt, and a message’s list of 
recipients. 
Id. § 2.  This article discussed that it is important for counsel to use electronic data to 
“become familiar with the forensics of the recovery and reconstruction of such data[]” 
when e-mails have been deleted from the system.  Id. § 1.  See also Dempsey, supra note 26, 
at 411 (noting that e-mails may contain private information).  Dempsey stated: 
More and more of our lives are conducted online and more and more 
personal information is transmitted and stored electronically.  
Financial statements, medical data[,] and records of commercial 
transactions are computerized.  Increasingly, book purchases, travel 
itineraries, and movie rentals are complied [sic] and stored online in 
“personal accounts.”  Most recently, storage has taken a new turn, as 
individuals use network capabilities to store draft documents, 
photos[,] and messages long since sent and retrieved--the kind of 
material once kept on paper and secure in a home or office. 
Id.  See also Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 
139, 139 (2005) (suggesting that it is surprising that this information can be accessed easier 
than a “search [of] our houses or even our cars[]”).  Id. 
174 See Slobogin, supra note 173, at 139. 
175 See Steere, supra note 117, at 233 (stating that the ECPA “fails to provide enough 
protection to satisfy the true historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment[]”). 
176 United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2002).  See Zittrain, supra note 148 at 
93  (“A lack of oversight or adversarial process for the kinds of searches that are about to 
become common threatens to have the exceptions dwarf the rule.”) 
177 See Rodriques v. Furtado, 575 N.E.2d 1124, 1126 (Mass. 1991).  In Rodriques, police 
reasonably obtained a “warrant to search the plaintiff’s vagina for narcotics” that included 
permission for that search “to be conducted by a licensed physician . . . .”  Id. at 1126 
(quotations omitted).  The court held that although it was a troublesome outcome, the 
doctors were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 1130. 
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search, without officers present, drastically decreases the amount of 
privacy afforded to individuals.178  One commentator called such 
unsupervised searches “sense-enhanced search[es,]” noting that these 
differ from the traditional “physical search.”179  To decide how much 
protection needs to be afforded during a search, courts consider the 
following factors:  space available for physical presence, technical 
expertise of the person conducting the search, and location of the items 
seized.180  Therefore, if the circumstances present themselves, it is likely 
that many seizures conducted without a police officer could violate 
Fourth Amendment rights because of the highly private correspondence 
that e-mails contain and the likelihood of exposure to ISP employees.  In 
comparison, United States postal workers, similar to ISP employees, 
would not open mail without ensuring that a police officer supervises 
the search, even where a warrant has been obtained.181 
Additionally, e-mail searches are not supposed to be an all-access 
pass for the government.182  Decades ago, the great statesman Henry 
Stimson observed, “Gentlemen [and ladies] do not read each other’s 
mail.”183  The Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent the “hated 
                                                 
178 Bach, 310 F.3d at 1067. 
179 See Steinberg, supra note 9, at 466 n.1 (Steinberg describes his use of the term “‘sense-
enhanced search’ to describe police examination of a person or [his] property through the 
use of some method that provides information not available to unaided sensory 
perceptions[]” and the term “‘physical search’ to describe the traditional police search, 
which relies on unaided sensory perception[]”). 
180 Bach, 310 F.3d at 1067.  In Bach, the court provided the following factors for evaluating 
the reasonableness of officer presence: 
(1) the actual physical presence of an officer would not have aided the 
search (in fact may have hindered it); (2) the technical expertise of 
Yahoo!’s technicians far outweighs that of the officers; (3) the items 
“seized” were located on Yahoo!’s property; (4) there was a warrant 
signed by a judge authorizing the search; and (5) the officers complied 
with the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2701. 
Id. 
181 See supra note 45 (discussing a postal worker’s lack of authority during a search and 
seizure of postal mail). 
182 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2004).  In Theofel, the court 
found an e-mail search under the SCA to be invalid where the government’s subpoena was 
overbroad.  Id.  The subpoena was not narrowed and the government took all e-mails from 
the desired account.  Id. at 1071.  See also Robert M. Goldstein & Martin G. Weinberg, The 
Stored Communications Act and Private E-Mail Communications, CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 18 
(concluding that the SCA provides the government with a “wholesale seizure” of its 
targets’ e-mails). 
183 See Steere, supra note 117, at 249 (quoting HENRY L. STIMSON, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN 
PEACE AND WAR 7 (1948)) (alteration in original). 
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writs” that surfaced in the eighteenth century.184  The idea is that 
government e-mail searches via warrant are narrowed by address, search 
terms, or time frames.185  This narrowed search is supposed to protect 
account holder privacy, but often does not have the opportunity to be 
effective because the government typically seizes entire accounts without 
any narrowing guidelines.186  Searches and seizures that are not 
narrowly tailored and that are open to ISP employee rummaging violate 
the Fourth Amendment.187 
When combined, the SCA’s provisions overwhelmingly cut in favor 
the government and deny meaningful protection to account-holding 
individuals.188  The delayed notice provision can be stretched to such an 
extent that it can preclude notice entirely, despite other sufficient 
methods of preserving evidence such as file backups provided by the 
SCA.189  Additionally, the lack of supervision of searches is 
problematic.190  This is especially true in situations where notice has not 
been provided to an account holder and the search is performed 
unbeknownst to the account holder.191  Despite the government’s 
invasive power and lack of protection for individuals, courts have not 
provided consistent guidance when deciding cases involving sections 
2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA.192 
B. Jurisprudential Inconsistencies 
Courts have been inconsistent when ruling on the constitutionality 
of the SCA, specifically sections 2703 and 2705.193  Subjective and open-
                                                 
184 See Snyder, supra note 10, at 1 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 n.13 
(1965)). 
185 O’Grady v. Superior Ct., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1448 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2006).  
Seeking disclosure of records or information from an identified sender or receiver can be 
considered outside of the statutory authorization.  Id. 
186 See supra note 92 (discussing Yahoo! and the privacy breaches that occur when e-mail 
searches are not narrowed). 
187 See Snyder, supra note 10, at 4.  When general warrants were issued, “officials, broke 
down at least 20 doors and scores of trunks, and broke hundreds of locks.”  Id.  Further, 
“the Fourth Amendment prohibits indiscriminate searches regardless of the technology 
involved[] . . . .”  Id. at 6. 
188 See supra Parts II.C.1–3 (discussing the interaction of sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of 
the SCA). 
189 See supra Part II.C.3 (outlining the delayed notice provision of the SCA). 
190 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing faxed warrants and seizures of 
entire accounts due to lack of official supervision). 
191 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing delayed notice provisions). 
192 See infra Part III.B (describing jurisprudential inconsistencies). 
193 Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability for All, Privacy for None:  the 
Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasive Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1481, 1482 (2007) (stating that “[c]onsequently, the current state of the law has left 
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ended terms in the Act leave room for much discretion and resemble the 
general warrants that the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution precludes.194  Furthermore, the lack of procedural 
safeguards and lack of checks on government provide great potential for 
the government to violate the constitutional privacy rights afforded to e-
mail account holders.195 
To start, laws that govern ISPs must take into account that providers 
are not all the same:  each provider has different requirements that 
governmental entities must meet when requesting account holder 
information, and a comprehensive law must account for these 
differences.196  Research regarding how an ISP storage system operates 
could shed light on exactly how search engines can be effective in 
generating results from the term searches included in warrants and 
subpoenas.197  Currently, general warrants are illegal and the term 
searches must be narrowed; however, currently term searches are often 
not narrowed.198  Due to the reality of generalized searches, more 
                                                                                                             
government, businesses, and private citizens without a clear sense of their legal rights, 
obligations, and liabilities[]”).  See also Steinberg, supra note 9, at 466–71 (concluding that 
Supreme Court decisions, where “sense-enhanced searches[]” are at issue, are inconsistent, 
arbitrary, and fail to develop a coherent body of law).  The statutory framework of the 
ECPA in general has been described as “notoriously confusing and unclear[,]” whereas 
“Fourth Amendment concepts tend to be relatively accessible.”  Id. at 475 (citing Daniel J. 
Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial 
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 747 (2005)). 
194 See supra Part II.C.4 (describing that by proposing an amendment to the SCA, 
Congress acknowledged the reality of objective searches). 
195 See supra Parts II.C.1–4 (outlining SCA sections 2703, 2704, and 2705). 
196 See supra Part II.A (discussing specifics about ISPs and acknowledging the wide 
variety of capabilities among various ISPs). 
197 See supra Part II.A.  See also 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 1, at § 1 (stating that 
e-mail often provides “smoking gun” evidence, and noting that e-mail can be recovered 
and reconstructed from computer files). 
[C]omputer data is not safe from disclosure merely because it has been 
“deleted” from a system or is contained in a damaged disk or hard 
drive.  “Using sophisticated computer programs, electronic mail 
messages or computer files thought to be deleted can be retrieved from 
the deep recesses of a computer data base long after they have 
disappeared from the screen.”  Given the potential value of such 
material, “[m]ore and more jilted employees, angry business rivals, 
and injured consumers are waging legal wars with floppy disks and 
hard drives.” 
Id. (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
198 See supra note 84 (suggesting specifics of how to narrow searches through fields and 
keywords). 
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supervision is necessary to ensure that government officials engage in 
appropriate ISP account searching.199 
The lack of concern for the privacy of e-mail content is almost 
certainly due to the limited knowledge that account holders have about 
their privacy rights when it comes to their e-mail account.200  This has to 
be a valid assumption due to judicial holdings and the opinions of legal 
theorists that e-mail is private and protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.201  Conversely, the fact that e-mail is constitutionally 
protected should give account holders the assurance that nobody can 
subpoena or search their e-mail.202 
Electronic communications law that began developing with Katz in 
the 1960s is applicable to e-mail.203  As an account holder, knowledge of 
network policies and how they apply to usage can be extremely 
valuable.204  Theoretically, network administrators may decide exactly 
how much privacy to give their account holders.205  Furthermore, the 
Smith third-party approach is valid in conjunction with users’ 
expectation of privacy.206  Writing an e-mail from an Internet café with 
six friends huddled around as a joke would not likely result in a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.  On the other hand, an individual who 
solely composes and sends an e-mail from the same Internet café while 
sitting in the corner would likely have legitimate privacy expectations.207  
                                                 
199 See supra notes 131, 180 (discussing how implementing the requirement of a police 
officer’s presence during searches provides more structure to the search and provides 
supervision, without which ISP employees become lazy and reveal full account content). 
200 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussion of delayed notice). 
201 See supra Part II.B (summarizing the development of electronic communications 
jurisprudence, first addressing seizures of letters and telephones and subsequently 
addressing e-mail seizures). 
202 See supra Part II.B (discussing the Smith third-party doctrine and server policies as 
avenues for the government to circumvent notice to the account holder); see also United 
States v. Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340 (D. Puerto Rico 2007) (suggesting that the 
ECPA is “hardly a legislative determination that this expectation of privacy is one that rises 
to the level of ‘reasonably objective’ for Fourth Amendment purposes[]”). 
203 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the development of electronic communications case 
law). 
204 See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing reasonable expectations and privacy policies and 
jurisprudence relating to both). 
205 See supra Part II.B.5 (analyzing the structure of privacy policies as related to 
reasonable expectations by users). 
206 See supra Part II.B.1; c.f. United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 118 (D. Mass. 
2007) (suppressing evidence gained from a phone call to the Department of Social Services 
by a third party who provided an e-mail link and password for access to pictures that 
incriminated defendants).  D’Andrea held that the third party doctrine trumps the 
expectation of privacy when information is conveyed to an outsider and that outsider 
conveys the information to the authorities.  Id. at 123. 
207 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Katz’s requirements to protect communications). 
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E-mail has been distinguished by the SCA based on the length of 
time that it is stored.208  The arbitrary length of time of 180 days is 
assigned to determine through which procedural channels the 
Government must navigate.209  Coincidently, such an arbitrary time 
frame does not apply to searches of letters and sealed containers.210  
Likely, similar information will result from seizures of information from 
both time frames.211  For example, the information from an account that 
sends payment reminders or confirmation messages to an individual’s e-
mail account is likely archived and will result in the same information 
retrieved whether the search is targeted at the last week or the last 
year.212  The government should have to prove the desired time frame 
and the desired content for the search because an account holder’s entire 
e-mail account is likely to have the same privacy expectations attached to 
it.213  Additionally, account information is a source of evidence that the 
government can easily obtain along with third-party communication as 
an alternative source that is less invasive of privacy.214  By giving the 
government direct access to e-mail content, the government circumvents 
long established privacy rights granted by the Fourth Amendment.215 
The uniqueness of e-mail should make it easier for the government 
to preserve evidence while building a case.  Unlike letters, packages, and 
telephone calls, e-mail inevitably leaves an electronic trail.216  Section 
2704 grants to the government the powerful tool of account 
preservation.217  Given the knowledge of such capabilities, questions 
should be raised as to why unlimited and objective delayed notice 
procedures in Section 2705 are necessary.218  The analogy drawn could be 
as follows:  if the government has the power of a fully armed tank, such 
                                                 
208 See supra Part II.C.1; supra note 126 (discussing the 181-day storage length for e-mail 
where e-mails more than 180 days old are easier for the Government to seize). 
209 See supra Part II.C.1; see also supra note 126 (discussing the Plaintiff-Appellee brief in 
Warshak I, which explains why the 180-day time frame seems arbitrary to the average 
subscriber). 
210 See infra text accompanying note 233 (claiming that e-mails and paper letters should 
be treated similarly). 
211 See supra note 126 (addressing the Warshak I brief’s discussion of the arbitrary 180-day 
timeframe for e-mail storage). 
212 See supra note 126 (addressing the Warshak I brief’s discussion of the arbitrary 180-day 
timeframe for e-mail storage). 
213 See supra notes 84, 182, 186 (discussing the narrowing of searches). 
214 See supra note 123 (citing text of the account information provision of the SCA). 
215 See supra Part II.B (discussing the background of electronic communications law that 
has strictly applied the Fourth Amendment).  
216 See supra Part II.A (outlining technical ISP basics). 
217 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining the application of section 2704 of the SCA to e-mail 
account preservation). 
218 See supra Part II.C.3 (explaining the delayed notice provision of the SCA). 
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as section 2704, then why does it need the musket-like power of section 
2705?  The simple answer is that it does not, and account holders are 
victims of an excessive and unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 
E-mail serves as a communication highway and should be 
vehemently protected as private under the Fourth Amendment, just as 
letters and telephone calls have been in the past.219  Because of the ease 
with which e-mail content is obtained from ISPs, the government has 
intruded upon the privacy that account holders believe guard their 
interests.220  Arbitrary and objective provisions in sections 2703, 2704, 
and 2705 combined have left the judiciary ill-equipped to address 
today’s e-mail issues, and the fifty-year-old doctrine of Katz has 
prevailed as the solution.221 
Simple adjustments can be made to the above mentioned sections of 
the SCA that will enhance the way in which the sections interact and 
reduce invasive governmental actions concerning private e-mail.  It is 
possible to protect individual privacy, give the government ample power 
to ensure national security, and bring the SCA back within the bounds of 
the Constitution by amending the SCA, as proposed next in Part IV, to 
cure its problematic sections. 
IV.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Reliance on protections such [as] individual computer accounts, password 
protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than 
reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of 
protection is penetrable.222 
                                                 
219 See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing notions of privacy attached to e-mail); see also supra 
Part II.B.1 (discussing initial judicial decisions involving electronic privacy issues such as 
Katz and Smith). 
220 See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing the presumed privacy that account holders believe 
attaches to e-mail). 
221 See supra note 94 (discussing the Warshak I court’s analysis of the similarities between 
telephone content and e-mail content).  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) 
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967)).  The Smith court explicitly 
“rejected the argument that a ‘search’ can occur only when there has been a ‘physical 
intrusion’ into a ‘constitutionally protected area,’ noting that the Fourth Amendment 
‘protects people, not places.’”  Id. at 739 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53). 
222 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6 at 721 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Randolph 
S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 1181, 1200 (1995)).  LaFave finds that e-mail has a justified expectation of privacy 
because it offers greater security than faxes, mail, shipping services and land-line 
conversations.  Id. at 726.  However, once the e-mail reaches a recipient, akin to a letter 
reaching its destination, the person who sent the item “has no valid Fourth Amendment 
complaint should the recipient turn the message over to the police or forward it on to 
others, or should the recipient turn out to be an undercover police officer.”  Id. at 727 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Courts have not effectively addressed the issue of e-mail privacy 
because the SCA provisions became confusing and unclear as technology 
strayed from using simplistic locks and bolts to protect our personal 
items.223  Furthermore, when courts apply the law, they are wary of 
Fourth Amendment conflicts that inevitably arise.224  Too many 
governmental safeguards conflict with constitutional guarantees of 
privacy.225  Some of the procedural aspects of the SCA must be 
downgraded to enhance notions of privacy.226  Therefore, this Note 
suggests the following amendments to the sections of the SCA that are 
problematic—sections 2703, 2304, and 2705.227  First, the 180 day time 
frame of e-mail preservations should be eliminated in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) 
to allow for a more even application in regard to e-mail seizures.228  
Next, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) must be modified to require police officer 
presence during searches of e-mail at electronic communications services 
or remote computing centers.229  Last, 18 U.S.C. § 2705 must be amended 
to clarify the objective terminology in § 2705(a)(5) describing an “adverse 
result,” heighten the standard for preclusion notice in § 2705(b), and 
explicitly grant injunctive relief when notice is not given at the expiration 
of delay periods for § 2705.230 
A. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) as follows, with the 
normal font representing the current statutory language, the text with a 
line through it representing the text the author of this Note proposes to 
delete from the statute, and the italicized text representing the text the 
author of this Note proposes to add to the statute: 
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in 
electronic storage.—A governmental entity may require 
the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communication service of the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in 
                                                 
223 See supra Part III.B (analyzing issues courts deal with when interpreting conflicts 
between the SCA and the Fourth Amendment). 
224 See supra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing Warshak I, Allen, Ashcroft (Doe I), and Gonzalez (Doe 
II)). 
225 See supra Part III.A (analyzing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA). 
226 See supra Part III.A (analyzing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA). 
227 See infra Part IV. 
228 See infra Part IV.A. 
229 See infra Part IV.B. 
230 See infra Parts IV.C–D. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6
2009] E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment 719 
an electronic communications system for one hundred 
and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant 
issued using the procedures described in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction 
over the offense under investigation or equivalent State 
warrant.  A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure by a provider of electronic communications 
services of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one 
hundred and eighty days, and by the means available 
under subsection (b) of this section. 
Commentary 
This proposed amendment to section 2703(a) is one way courts, ISPs, 
and account holders can apply the SCA as a blanket when executing a 
search.  Trying to figure out the time distinction as the statute currently 
states is a waste of valuable resources because in the end individual 
account holders subjectively regard all of their e-mail as having the same 
amount of privacy.231  Furthermore, objectively, the public at large does 
not use time as a factor for distinguishing whether the correspondence is 
more or less private.232  Last, e-mails are said to be given the same 
amount of privacy as sealed letters and telephone calls, which do not 
operate on a scaled, time frame basis.  Therefore, just because it is easier 
to preserve e-mails on a server, than to preserve letters in a shoebox, e-
mails should not be treated drastically different than letters in a 
shoebox.233 
B. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) as follows, with the 
normal font representing the current statutory language and the text 
with a line through it representing the text the author of this Note 
proposes to delete from the statute.   
(g) Presence of officer not required.—Notwithstanding 
section 3105 of this title,The presence of an officer shall 
not be required for service or execution of a search 
warrant issued in accordance with this chapter requiring 
                                                 
231 See supra note 126 (Warshak I court discussing the time limits placed by the SCA). 
232 See supra note 126 (Warshak I court discussing the time limits placed by the SCA). 
233 See supra note 95 (analogizing letters and sealed containers to e-mails). 
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disclosure by a provider of electronic communications 
service or remote computing service of the contents of 
communications or records or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service. 
Commentary 
This proposed amendment to section 2703(g) is a means to the end of 
preserving privacy.  Within the same title, under the current statutory 
language, section 3105 requires officer presence during the service and 
execution of the warrant; however, section 2703 is exempt from this 
requirement.  This proposed amendment to the current language reins in 
the power of employees to haphazardly sift through e-mails, while, at 
the same time, adequately preserves the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee 
of privacy.234  Additionally, officer presence enhances the search and 
seizure of e-mails by adding authority to the process.235  Like postal 
employees, who are not allowed to open letters even when a warrant is 
presented, ISP workers should not have that power either.236  Therefore, 
this minor and important adjustment enhances the process in a variety of 
ways. 
C. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(5) 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(5) as follows, with the 
normal font representing the current statutory language and the 
italicized text representing the text the author of this Note proposes to 
add to the statute. 
(a)(5) Upon expiration of the period of delay of 
notification under paragraph (1) or (4) of this subsection, 
the governmental entity shall serve upon, or deliver by 
registered or first-class mail to, the customer or 
subscriber a copy of the process or request together with 
notice that— 
(A) states with reasonable specificity the nature 
of the law enforcement inquiry; and 
(B) informs such customer or subscriber— 
                                                 
234 See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing the need for law 
enforcement officer presence during an e-mail search). 
235 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing one theorist’s view on police 
officer presence during e-mail searches). 
236 See supra note 45 (discussing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)). 
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(i)  that information maintained for 
such customer or subscriber by the 
service provider named in such 
process or request was supplied to 
or requested by that governmental 
authority and the date on which the 
supplying or request took place; 
(ii)  that notification of such customer or 
subscriber was delayed; 
(iii)  what governmental entity or court 
made the certification or 
determination pursuant to which 
that delay was made; and 
(iv)  which provision of this chapter 
allowed such delay. 
If, upon expiration of the delay, notice is not served as dictated 
above to the account holder, then injunctive relief shall be 
granted barring all seized documents from evidence. 
Commentary 
Language describing an injunction must be added to the delayed 
notice provision as a restraint on government abuse.  Currently, 
government actors do not provide notice to account holders whose 
circumstances have fallen under this provision, which results in a Fourth 
Amendment violation.237  The SCA does not currently explicitly state 
that injunctive relief is proper.238  This amendment to section 2705(a)(5) 
will provide much needed clarity for courts; it will be clear that any 
unauthorized e-mails obtained in violation of giving notice shall be 
excluded from evidence.  Thus, this proposed change will save judicial 
resources and provide a constitutionally just result to the account holder. 
D. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) as follows, with the 
normal font representing the current statutory language, the text with a 
line through it representing the text the author of this Note proposes to 
delete from the statute, and the italicized text representing the text the 
author of this Note proposes to add to the statute. 
                                                 
237 See supra notes 84, 182, 186 (discussing the use of broad, not narrow, searches by ISPs 
to protect privacy). 
238 See supra note 92 (discussing suppression remedies and the Fourth Amendment). 
Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
722 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
(b) Preclusion of notice to subject of governmental 
access.—A governmental entity acting under section 
2703, when it is not required to notify the subscriber or 
customer under section 2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it 
may delay such notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
section, may apply to a court for an order commanding a 
provider of electronic communications service or remote 
computing service to whom a warrant, subpoena, or 
court order is directed, for such  period as the court 
deems appropriateninety days, not to notify any other 
person of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or 
court order.  The court shall enter such an order if it 
determines that there is reason to believe that 
notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or 
court order will result in— 
(1) endangering the life or physical safety of an 
individual; 
(2) flight from prosecution; 
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence; 
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or 
unduly delaying trial. 
Commentary 
Delayed notice creates the biggest Fourth Amendment concern for 
subscribers.239  By delaying notice that the government seized and 
examined the contents of private e-mail, section 2705 as it is currently 
drafted exceeds governmental limits as designated in the Constitution.240  
To curtail the effect of lack of notice, the unlimited preclusion for delay 
must be deleted from the SCA and a designated timeframe added, such 
as ninety days.241  This proposed change enhances the SCA, brings it 
back within Fourth Amendment guarantees, and leaves open the 
opportunity to merge section 2705(b) with section 2705(a)(4), which 
provides a consistent approach for efficiency’s sake.  Additionally, 
section 2705(b)(5) should enumerate examples to lessen the objective 
nature of court decisions.  Such objectivity can lead to entirely different 
                                                 
239 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing delayed notice); see also supra Part III.A (analyzing the 
same). 
240 See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional problems 
with delayed notice). 
241 See supra text accompanying note 170 (discussing the potential infinite preclusion of 
notice). 
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outcomes and, when privacy is at issue, individual rights should not 
tolerate this inconsistency.242  Finally, this proposed change restrains the 
SCA from violating privacy rights by still providing direction to the 
government and courts regarding how to search and seize e-mail from 
third party ISPs. 
The above proposed amendments to the SCA together will reduce 
the likelihood of unconstitutional encroachment on account holders’ 
privacy rights.243  As demonstrated, the proposed changes are not 
drastic, and yet, effectively achieve the goals of the government and 
account holders, and assist courts in interpreting the SCA.  By 
minimizing excessive governmental safeguards, the proposed 
amendments streamline the SCA to protect both the Government’s 
interest in preserving evidence and the subscriber’s interest in 
maintaining privacy.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Tolling for the aching ones whose wounds cannot be nursed 
For the countless confused, accused, misused, strung-out ones an’ worse 
An’ for every hung-up person in the whole wide universe 
An’ we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.244 
 
Freedom from search and seizure will soon be a flash before the eyes 
of many Americans as Fourth Amendment interests are trampled by the 
SCA.  Too much time has passed without action to restore e-mail account 
holder privacy interests.  If the amendments to the SCA proposed in Part 
IV of this Note are implemented, then embarrassment, like the 
embarrassment described in Part I suffered by John Jones’s family, will 
be eliminated or certainly mitigated.  Pursuant to the amendments 
proposed in Part IV, the government would not be allowed to search e-
mail contents without a warrant, and the search would be supervised 
                                                 
242 See supra note 92 (comparing United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 
2007) and Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on 
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), 
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)). 
243 See supra Part II.C (comparing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA, and 
discussing the way all three sections interact together). 
244 BOB DYLAN, CHIMES OF FREEDOM (Legacy Recordings 1964).  Released in 1964, just 
three years before the United States Supreme Court decided Katz, Chimes of Freedom may be 
analogized to today’s invasion of e-mail privacy.  See id.  See also Mike Marqusee, CHIMES 
OF FREEDOM:  THE POLITICS OF BOB DYLAN’S ART (2003).  Chimes of Freedom represented a 
transition between Dylan’s early protest style and his later poetic tendencies, and serves as 
a warning that the problems of yesterday are still faced today.  See Marqusee, supra. 
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and narrowly tailored, thus discouraging Betty Eyez from her nosy 
habits.  By applying the suggested changes as proposed, Congress will 
be able to rein in the government’s unconstitutional behavior and still 
achieve the goal of preserving evidence. 
E-mail is the communication of today’s world.  It is not limited to 
just today’s children, but also yesterday’s children, as parents and 
grandparents increasingly log on to their computers to see what awaits 
them in their e-mail inboxes.  As the variety of transactions from our 
home computers increases exponentially, account holders’ privacy 
interests become all the more precious.  The SCA is currently written in 
such a way that leaves too many standards open-ended.  Courts have 
inconsistently interpreted the SCA, leaving many questions remaining 
about how to apply sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA, while not 
offending the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals.  Congress 
should revise the SCA according to the amendments proposed in Part IV 
and ensure the privacy guarantees on which our Founders established 
this country.  As Justice Stewart so eloquently stated thirty years ago, 
“[privacy] considerations do not vanish when the search in question is 
transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that 
of a telephone booth.  Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that 
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”245 
Kimberly S. Cuccia∗ 
                                                 
245 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (emphasis added). 
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